PACE's answer before March 23 was that it "is concerned that the necessary conditions for holding such a referendum are unlikely to be met by this date", and it "calls upon the competent authorities to take essential steps to achieve such conditions", but it is "recognising the role of a referendum in deciding the future democratic structure and constitution of the Republic".[19] In other words, in its usual very diplomatic way that shouldn't upset Russia too much it said: "you could make it better but after all its fine and go ahead". It accepted a constitutional referendum that contradicts the norms of international law (according to which the absence of violence or a threat of violence is a mandatory condition for conducting free elections) and would have no legal grounds in any Western democratic country. Later Gil-Robles, stated that "holding the referendum is a beginning" of a political resolution in Chechnya.[20] But short after, responding to a Chechen journalist: "...there is no hope that immediately after the referendum life will become normal in Chechnya".[21] But the still unanswered question was if PACE should send observers to the referendum. If it would send observers who eventually failed in finding illegal voting procedures (Russia had no necessity to falsify the voting session making it appear perfectly legal, because, as we already outlined, the overall conditions were illegal from the outset) then it would have been forced to recognize the result. On the other side, not sending any observer implicitly meant Europe's denial to recognize the referendum. And that could obviously make the relationship with Moscow troubling. So PACE had the wonderful idea not to send observers but added, through the voice of its deputy speaker Mikhail Margelov, that "this decision was made for security reasons, not political" and that "in the meantime PACE is very positive about the referendum itself, and believes it will mean a considerable step towards achieving a political settlement" and moreover, after having been perfectly silent and indifferent on a genocide, suddenly "they deemed that they have no right to put the lives of Russian soldiers in danger for their security".[22]

Russian soldiers (and a dog?) voting for a "Chechen constitution".

On the day of the referendum, according to Russian sources^[23], 96% of voters have approved the constitution, over 88 per cent of Chechnya's adult population took part in the voting and two other laws, on electing a president and a parliament for the republic, were approved by 96 per cent of voters. In other words, after centuries of slaughters, torture, rapes, deportations and humiliations, an incredible 96% of Chechens still wants to "stay Russian"!?

It seems that all kinds of manipulations were possible (to the point that two journalists of the "Le Figaro" and "The Guardian" were able to vote when they showed their French and British passport) and the rate of participants is, to say it euphemistically, somewhat "surprising" considering that, according to an opinion poll conducted by the Russian human rights organization “Memorial“ in Chechnya and Ingushetia between February 22 and March 14, only 12% of the Chechen population had planned on taking part in the constitutional referendum. And according to the few observers allowed, while at the polling stations the number of people entering were counted in few hundreds the number of votes cast ran in the thousands.

But this didn't discourage Europe's "optimism". The following day, Diego de Ojeda, the EU commission's external affairs spokesman, said "the EU today welcomed yesterday's constitutional referendum in Chechnya as a 'positive step'", that the referendum "becomes a basis for a 'comprehensive' political solution in Chechnya" and that "it had achieved a high turnout".^[24] French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin, at a session of the United Nations Human Rights Commission in Geneva, was no less cynical: "Bearing in mind the challenges facing Russia in the North Caucasus", we must see how, "the referendum in Chechnya is the first step towards political settlement". After having used this quite doubtful double standard policy on human rights, Mr. de Villepin spoke out for an "objective approach to human rights matters" and against "the use of double standards in this area", stressing that "none of us should try to teach lessons to others".^[25] Which means that, for Mr. Villepin, silence is the best answer and that the European institutions should make themselves accomplices of the Russian propaganda farce, the so called "referendum". And about three weeks later, one source of the senior EU officials in a talk with Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov said that "we are seeing some positive signs, such as the high participation in a recent referendum and the proposal for a new constitution".^[26] But perhaps the champions of cynicism were the French Defense Minister Michele Alliot-Marie who said: "...we know that the population of Chechnya has long been dreaming of this", and some months later the Italian foreign Minister Franco Frattini introducing the Italian European presidency: "This [the referendum] has shows that the Chechen population, tired of the war, has chosen for the political solution and wants to remain in the Russian Federation. At the same time this has shown that the separatist leader and rebel Maskhadov and his followers has to a good degree lost the recognition of the civil society."^[26b]

If Europe will continue to stand against its own values accepting this blatant falsification and humiliating falsehood, practicing a brutal cynicism, believing that this might somehow help to build a base for a new political process in Chechnya, it will not only insult others but also its own intelligence. Because if Europe and its CoE representatives, will subject itself to this verdict they will not only send the terrible message that they agree that Russia can continue to rule over Chechnya with its usual brutal means, and that people as Maskhadov can be brushed aside (and in more practical terms they might be forced to recognize afterwards Kremlin's puppet government of Kadyrov), giving even more power to extremism and encouraging a radical feedback, but they will increasingly shift themselves to a position that is willing in being the tool of those forces who regularly commit human rights violation and war crimes, i.e. they will be used just by those they were originally supposed to resist and defeat.

OSCE's attitude hasn't been an example of "humanitarian correctness" either, quite the contrary. Its silent complicity became evident since the beginning of CW1. Moreover, one of its main characteristics has always been its smallness and its permanent state of staff and money shortage because of the member states refusal to deliver appropriate fundings.

In a December 1994 OSCE meeting in Budapest, while Russian's military aggressive intention against the Caucasian Republic was already clear to anyone, no one of the members of this "security" organization dared to rise its voice of opposition, they even didn't ask a question about the matter. Instead it signed an agreement on a military code of conduct with Russia. That this code didn't have any value for both sides became clear only few days later when Russia violated it by Chechnya's invasion, whereas OSCE replayed that after all the Chechen conflict should be regarded only as its "domestic affair", just as Russia expected.

On November 19, 1999, OSCE signed with Russia during a meeting in Istanbul, an agreement according to which the organization had to play a humanitarian rule in Chechnya, trying to set up a policy that should prevent ethnic cleansings as those that occurred in the former Yugoslavia, and build a civil structure aimed at organizing fast and efficient interventions in case of a humanitarian catastrophe. But the final declaration reads "we fully acknowledge the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation and condemn terrorist attacks in all its forms". They forgot however to condemn also terrorist attacks from all the sides. And that this was only a farce became clear almost immediately, when on November 29, Putin (still not president) told to Knut Vollebaek, president of OSCE, how Russia doesn't need external observers in order to regulate its internal affairs, declaring with this that Russia regards the agreement, signed only ten days earlier, as having no value. OSCE replied with silence.

However, a little OSCE mission could nevertheless operate on the Chechen territory under severe restrictions on freedom of movement. This lasted three years when the OSCE mission of observers in Chechnya has been closed by Russian authorities again at the end of December 2002. Despite ongoing reports of rampant human rights abuses by Russian troops in the war-torn republic, the Kremlin said the mission's closure is possible because the situation in the region has returned to normal. Meaningful is that representatives from Chechnya's separatist government said they do not regret the change, as the OSCE played a passive and largely ineffective role. Spokesman for President Maskhadov said that the mission was "inactive" and that "repeated complaints from the Chechen side against abuse and violence against civilians by Russian federal forces fell on deaf ears." On the other side the West expressed its anxiety with respect to the dismissal of the OSCE mission in Chechnya. But this anxiety is hardly credible: it seems to be more a justification aimed at its public opinion or the future generations of Europeans and Americans who will know about the genocide. OSCE's role in contributing to find a political solution to the conflict has so far been almost completely without any value.

Meanwhile the European reluctance to grant some support (not to say asylum) to exiled Chechen representatives continues. Mr Akhmed Zakayev, the Minister of Culture, from 1997 to 1999 in the Chechen government of President  Maskhadov is threatened with extradition in Great Britain. Mr Lom-Ali Aldamov, the minister of Trade and a refugee in Georgia, presented an application for asylum in France. The application was rejected by the Home Minister first, but a court recognized it and the proceedings are now under way. Still France rejected the asylum application to Ruslan Maigov and his family. Ruslan Maigov is the brother of the former Chechen representative of Maskhadov. Despite the fact that he had been more than once arrested and severely beaten by Russian authorities and has been even kidnapped, the OFPRA (the French refugees office) nevertheless refused him asylum justifying this with the fact that his brother, who lives in Moscow, has so far not been subjected to any threat. Similar fate met Mr Khanbiev, the Health Minister, whose Schengen visa has not been renewed, and Mrs Dudaeva, the widow of President Dudayev, whose passport has not been renewed either. And several less notorious Chechens have been extradited from Austria, Sweden, Belgium and other European countries with hardly credible justifications. Refugees frequently get a refusal to cross boarders. Others have been expelled from France, Germany, Austria, the Netherlands and other European nations back to Russia. According to the German Society for Threatened Peoples the Lower Saxony refugees comitee claims to be able to document cases where refugees, once they had been forced back by the Germans towards Russia, were tortured by the Russian authorities which took them in custody.

Apparently the Council does not believe that it should proceed without further delay to a "white list" of Chechen figures to whom the Union could grant visas, stay permits and other documents necessary to allow them to carry out their activities in favor of a political settlement of the Chechen tragedy. One sometimes wonders if it is the voice of a libertarian and democratic Europe or the hostage of Russian's bureaucrats? (And by the way, the US are apparently not doing it much better: Mr Akhmadov, the Foreign Minister, is blocked in the United States without a passport too.)

The new order word Putin is now trying to sell as part of his "peace plan" in Chechnya, together with this farce constitutional and presidential elections, is a so called "amnesty". An amnesty which is supposed to pardon Chechen militants if they depose arms and is apparently offering them the possibility to return to "a normal and peaceful life". The amnesty, approved by Russia's parliament, was touted as a step toward peace, offering immunity from prosecution to rebels who give up their weapons by September 1, 2003. Apparently a serious act of state forgiveness and mercy which should convince the Chechen guerrilla at least to a cease fire and subsequently to give up their arms and stop the warfare.

But what stands really behind this apparent chance of peace and political opening?

First of all, one has to recall that this is not the first time that an amnesty is being used as a political tool for pacification. It follows at least two others. The most significant was the one proclaimed in March 1997, another pardon followed in March 2000, shortly after the second conflict began. Many of those who gave themselves up later regretted doing so. Aslambek Aslakhanov, a State Duma deputy from Chechnya, stated that in that of those rebels who surrendered, "500 people were released, from among them, not many are alive today. Many have been secretly liquidated by special services"^[26c] In other words, the amnesty showed to be only a trap. The Chechen rebels soon learned the lesson and it is unlikely that they will now come to surrender so easily. After all one has only to look back in the Russian-Chechen history to remember that also in 1930 a revolt in Chechnya ended in an armistice and amnesty, but one year later Stalin's authorities killed all the Chechen rebel leaders who showed up. The rebellion began all over again until 1936, where Stalin's purges put everything to an end. Things seem not to be different for this amnesty either. According to an article ^[26c2] on the Prague Watchdog Website the Russian human rights NGO Memorial cited the case of a rebel group headed by Abubakar Magomadov that had surrendered near the town of Komsomosk on March 21, 2003. “Immediately after appearing on television, 13 of the men were shot. The soldiers then cut off the head of one victim and placed it in a pail of boiling liquid. Seventy other captives were later transported to Alkhan-Kala where several received 3 to 5 year sentences, so amnesty will certainly never be granted them,” Baysayev declared. And Andrei Riskin of Nezavisimaya gazeta is not among those impressed by the actual results of the amnesty for surrendering Chechen rebels that took formal effect earlier this month. "So far only [June 36, 2003] seventy guerrillas have given themselves up," he wrote, "and by the way who has actually seen them?" ^[26c3]

Then, in this amnesty, as in the previous ones, there is no offer for a political dialogue from the Russian side. What is offered to the Chechen leadership who will surrender is an unconditional acceptance of the Russian rule over their country. Moreover, just during the same days where Putin launched the proposal of an amnesty, he clearly reiterated his refusal to open any political talks and vowed to crush rebel resistance. "We will certainly finish this task", he said.^[26d]

Therefore, in the best case what has been offered is not an amnesty but simply an unconditional surrender.

But this turned out to be a still too optimistic view. According to Anna Politkovskaya, Lev Levinson^[26e], an expert from the Human Rights Institute who worked in the Duma for many years and who analyzed the text of the presidential amnesty, and which has now been approved by the Duma, makes it clear that not only isn't there any kind of "amnesty" for Chechen rebels, but on the contrary it is a subtle but decisive move to introduce the use of torture and legalize crimes against humanity committed by the Russian servicemen. What it really amnesties, i.e. in fact legalizes, is the use of Russian or international mercenary soldiers or contract killers who, if recognized guilty of torture and genocide for facts committed in the past, present or future, can be forgiven:^[26e]

"All of those who held a weapon in their hands (but who, we might ask, has not held one during the period since 12 December 1993, the amnesty's point of departure?), all of them, without exception, can stop wondering: The presidential amnesty will not apply to them. Of course, certain sections of the Criminal Code are excluded from the amnesty, such as murder (Sec 105), kidnapping (Sec 126), robbery (Sec 162), terrorism (Sec 205), the taking of hostages (Sec 206), the desecration of corpses (Sec 244), and many, many others: These are grave and completely indefensible crimes, but.... The amnesty also does not cover individuals guilty of the following: Section 295 (attempted murder of an individual administering justice or conducting a preliminary investigation), Section 296 (threats or acts of violence during the administration of justice or a preliminary investigation), Section 317 (attempted murder of a law enforcement officer, a serviceman, or members of their families) and, finally, Section 334 (acts of violence against a superior).... All of those who laid mines, and even those who carried ammunition or simply stood guard, or knew about this--ALL of them are INELIGIBLE for the amnesty, because these were acts of "attempted murder," "threats, "obstruction"....In general, this means that almost ALL of the actions in Chechnya since 1993 are not covered by the state pardon.

By the same token, virtually ALL participants in the armed resistance of federal forces are ineligible.Then what is the point? If you want to know, keep reading: The presidential amnesty does apply to such crimes as genocide, mercenary soldiery, and torture (secs 34, 357, and 359). Is this an accident? Is it an oversight? Is it the result of excessive haste in the compilation of the text? Of course not. It was deliberate. This is how the document had to be worded, and there is a simple reason for this: Mercenary soldiery and torture were and are practiced by Kadyrov, the present head of the republic, and his gang. They do this under the Kremlin's auspices, and they have to be taken out of the line of fire.... Genocide ("crimes against the peace and security of mankind"), on the other hand, is mainly the realm of the federal servicemen. I assure you that this statement is not a case of human rights rhetoric, tears, and emotions, but a fact. Agencies of the procuracy already filed charges against some servicemen for genocide during the second Chechen war. It is true that they are trying to put the brakes on these charges.... Nevertheless, they were filed! The "sweeping amnesty," therefore, is actually a bribe offered to the military and to "our Chechens."

The 'sweeping amnesty', therefore, is actually a bribe offered to the military and to 'our Chechens'.

In conclusion, I must mention another indicative fact. According to the presidential proposal, even the administration of the amnesty will be entrusted ... to the Chechen administration, to no one other than Kadyrov and his henchmen. The foxes will oversee the chickens. They will process the statements of rebels admitting that they fought in a particular detachment under the command of a particular individual (this information is required), and they will start using the mechanism they received from the Duma for the purpose of.... For deplorable purposes.... We can predict that the 'latest step toward peace in Chechnya' will have the following consequences: From now until 1 August 2003 (the deadline for the amnesty) [actually 1 September 2003], "genocide," "torture," and "mercenary soldiery" will be commonplace in Chechnya. Anyone committing these acts will be pardoned later anyway. We can safely assume that Kadyrov will have time before 1 August [1 September] to retaliate against his enemies and, in general, against anyone who does not want the elections in Chechnya--parliamentary and presidential--to be a fiasco."

This is the "amnesty" of Putin.

While Putin was presenting this meaningless "peace plan", covered with nice words as "free elections", "referendum", "broad autonomy" and "amnesty", and continued to refuse any negotiation with rebel leaders and publicly vowed to crush the rebel resistance, Ilyas Akhmadov, the foreign minister of Maskhadov's government, launched another desperate appeal to the international community, in particular to the Western nations in the forecast of the EU-Russia summit meeting in Saint Petersburg's tricentennial celebrations in June 2003:

"While the government of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria categorically and unconditionally rejects suicide attacks and condemns all acts of terrorism, regardless of who may perpetrate them, a just peace is ultimately the only way to prevent this deeply alarming trend. We therefore urge the government of the Russian Federation to close this chapter of war and destruction; to introduce a ceasefire; and to launch transparent, unconditional negotiations genuinely designed to resolve the centuries old Russo-Chechen conflict. A lasting political solution ultimately is in the best interests of both the Russian and Chechen peoples. The Chechen people stand in solidarity with those nations faithfully engaged in the battle against international terrorism. Accordingly, we renew our call for an international war crimes tribunal to investigate atrocities within the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and punish those guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity. We also call upon the European Union, its member states, and the United States of America to assist Chechnya and Russia, through mediation, in ending the conflict and overcoming its painful legacies. Only a genuine political solution will free the Chechen and Russian peoples from this vicious circle of violence and destruction".^[26f]

During the same days also Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch appealed to the UE leaders. "It is now time for the EU to make a meaningful contribution to the solution of the conflict in Chechnya, and achieve concrete results for the human rights of the Chechen population," said Dick Oosting, Director of Amnesty International’s EU Office. [...] The EU must urge the Russian President to agree to take immediate action to: guarantee protection now of the human rights of the Chechen population including the internally displaced; bring to justice those responsible for the grave abuses committed during the conflict in Chechnya; grant access to Chechnya to UN human rights rapporteurs, reestablish a monitoring presence of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and reaffirm the commitment to cooperate with Council of Europe experts." While Elizabeth Andersen, executive director of Human Rights Watch's Europe and Central Asia division said: “EU and U.S. leaders should look beyond the festivities to Russia’s appalling human rights record in Chechnya. [...] The number of murders and forced disappearances committed in Chechnya makes the republic one of the most dangerous places on earth. St. Petersburg’s splendor should not eclipse this. [...] According to recently released official statistics, 1,132 civilians were killed in Chechnya in 2002, making the murder rate there more than five times higher than in St. Petersburg and one hundred times higher than in EU countries. Since the beginning of the conflict, hundreds have disappeared without a trace after being detained by Russian troops. Official statistics indicate that at least two people “disappear” in Chechnya every day, and showed no decrease in the number of disappearances for the first three months of 2003.[...] Human Rights Watch strongly urged EU and US leaders to use the summit to seek commitments from President Putin regarding Russia’s compliance with key U.N. and Council of Europe requirements and regarding protection and security guarantees for Chechen civilians."^[26fb]

As expected all this fall on deaf ears.

More than 20 heads of state took part in the Russia-EU summit held in Russia's Northern Capital: 14 EU leaders, and the heads of the 10 candidates for accession, who attended the gathering in the capacity of observers. The EU-Russia St. Petersburg summit might be remembered as one of the worst chapters of Western realpolitk. Perhaps only during the Munich conference agreement in 1938 one could see similar obscenities. Here a short list of the statements coming from this new revived "Chamberlain and Petain Europe".^[26g]

Greek Prime Minister Costas Simitis, whose country holds the rotating EU presidency, said: "The European Union will continue to support the efforts of Russian leaders to carry out a policy aiming to bring peace back to Chechnya." Simitis praised the Russian president's peace plan, launched with a constitutional referendum in March and a subsequent offer of rebel amnesty. "The recent referendum, combined with the approved amnesty, is an important step forward," he said. It "has helped to make a large step towards the restoration of stability''. What kind of stability he was talking about remains a mystery: this suability was already blown up at the time of these words by suicide attacks that killed about 80 people and the carnage wracking Chechnya daily didn't show in the least any sign of betterment: heavy fighting between Russian and Chechen guerrilla left about 5-10 dead per day on the ground.

British Prime Minister Tony Blair delivered a glowing endorsement of Putin's policy in war-torn Chechnya praising the "peace process", saying: "I think it is absolutely right that you resolve that through the political process and political dialogue that you have engaged in." Blair said the referendum result was "a very, very important step forwards." (The repetition of the word "very" in the original).

French President Jacques Chirac said European leaders wanted to underline "our common hope to see the March 23 referendum open the path to peace and reconciliation in the framework of a political process."

Jan Peter Balkenende, the prime minister of the Netherlands, OSCE's chairman, also welcomed the recently started political process and said it "supports the path chosen by the Russian Federation as the right and only one."

The European Commission's president, Romano Prodi, was not short of purple metaphors to describe the new entente between Europe and Russian that the St. Petersburg summit was supposed to portray: 'I told Vladimir that now we are like vodka and caviar,' he said.

And Bush during a visit to the Auschwitz nazi concentration camp, short before his appointment in St. Petersburg: "This is a time for all of us to unite in the defence of liberty, and to step up to the shared duties of free nations. Aggression and evil intent must not be ignored and appeased. They must be opposed early and decisively." 24 hours later he met with Putin, praising and applauding, as everyone else, his nazi-like genocidal policy in Chechnya.

The final declaration issued after the summit's end states that Russia and the EU "note the recent referendum and express the hope that the recently launched political process, as well as social and economic development, will bring back a state based on law that favorizes the protection of human rights and finally a real reconciliation in Chechnya," it said. Obviously, the European leaders condemned "in particular terror acts", but did not mention the fact that Russian soldiers have killed, raped and robbed Chechen civilians and brutalized them during so-called mopping-up operations aimed at flushing out rebels.

In September 2003 the amnesty for rebels was over. The amnesty offered by Russia supposed to encourage Chechen rebels to lay down their arms got a larger response from Russian soldiers and civilians than from the insurgents. According to deputy Prosecutor-General Sergei Fridinsky only 170 Chechen rebels have left their units under the amnesty and that 226 "servicemen, interior and penitentiary service officials and civilians" have benefited from the amnesty. In other words neither the referendum nor the amnesty brought any positive results. Other sources, with only slightly different statistics, came to the same conclusion.^[26h] The number of killings and kidnappings has not diminished. The war continues, suicide bombings occur and kidnappings and violence on the innocent population remain an everyday reality.

The farce of the referendum continued about six months later with the "presidential elections" in Chechnya scheduled for October 5, 2003. Same conditions. Same threatening and intimidating policy of the referendum of March 23. Akhmad Kadyrov was the Kremlin appointed interim president of Chechnya and Russian officials were anxious to ensure that he remained in charge of the Chechen administration. When public opinion polls were released in late August, Kadyrov trailed, with a scarce 15%, behind three other presidential hopefuls – Moscow-based businessmen Hussein Djabrailov and Malik Saidullayev, along with a Chechen representative in the Russian State Duma, Aslanbek Aslakhanov. In the weeks since the release of the polling data Kadyrov’s challengers were forced out of the race. Djabrailov announced his withdrawal immediately after meeting in the Kremlin with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s chief of staff, Aleksandr Voloshin. Aslakhanov said he decided to quit after he got a phone call from Putin himself offering him a job as presidential advisor on southern Russia issues. Saidullayev was barred from running by Chechnya’s Supreme Court, which ruled that his campaign petitions contained forged signatures. Kadyrov became at this point the only candidate with a realistic chance of winning.

Meanwhile a reorganization of Chechen mass media structures accompanied a so called "presidential campaign". In early September, Chechen Minister of Press and Information, the alkready mentioned Bislan Gantamirov, an outspoken Djabrailov supporter, was sacked and his ministry merged with the republic’s Nationalities Ministry. The chief of Kadyrov’s campaign staff was put in charge of the new governmental body. Shortly after Gantamirov’s firing, Kadyrov’s personal security service seized the Grozny TV station. Pro-Kadyrov forces also took control of the editorial offices of all eight Chechen newspapers. This gave finally Kadyrov a control over all of the region’s major mass media outlets.

According to the few observers present, Kadyrov posters suddenly appeared on nearly all buses and walls inside the republic. "Clad in camouflage fatigues and armed with Kalashnikovs, Kadyrov's men move around freely in checkpost-filled Chechnya. Residents in Chechnya say the 'Kadyrovtsy' have been riding around the republic and terrorizing the population into voting for their boss. If before locals blamed Russian troops, the 'federals' for most of the disappearances and killings among civilians in Chechnya, today they say: 'either the federals or Kadyrovtsy."^[26i]

After about seven months all this was blown up. On May 9th, 2004, Russian President Vladimir Putin's top man in Chechnya, Akhamd Kadyrov, has been assassinated in a bomb attack that killed several other people. The attack on the top-security event attended by military and political officials tore through the VIP section of a stadium where dignitaries were gathered to celebrate the 1945 victory over Nazi Germany. This turned out to be a huge blow to the Kremlin leader's efforts of "normalization". Putin's political  process in Chechnya was torn to pieces in a single bomb blast.

It is clear that this kind of Western policy which accepts as an established fact all this, devoid of any fundamental values and principles and that doesn't dare to rise its voice against violations of the most elementary rights, resembles more than ever the pre-nazi Europe of Munich before World War II. Its implicit and now explicit alliance and collaboration with an almost fascist-stalinist regime is more than ever evident. If in the UE, the CoE and in the USA the influence of those who honestly stand on the side of truth will not grow stronger and it won't have the courage to set aside a subtle, passive, unwilling and indulgent diplomacy, exerting instead a serious pressure on Russia, then it is most likely that in the best case they will become only puppets in the hands of "realpolitical Ministers" of the EU member countries, furthering the restoration of the status quo, or in the most likely case, they might become the hostages of a new criminal regime and the voice of war criminals. The danger of "partnership" with criminal regimes is that they never stop until they make you an accomplice in their crimes. Slowly but surely, as the Saint Petersburg summit has clearly shown, the Russian rulers, because of common commercial political and strategic interests, are forcing their Western partners, together with their "face-saving" organizations like the CoE and OSCE, to accept and even contribute to their crimes and massacres. The secret hope of the European Chamberlain and Petain like bureaucrats is that ignoring the threat of these criminal regimes, and on the contrary favoring their appetites, might keep them under control. This unfortunately is a vain chimera, an illusion. The evil (just to put it in Bush's words) will only profit from it to expand its power and influence. A power the free nations will sooner or later have to deal with.

The authoritarian involution of Russia

Chechnya is an international time bomb. The tragedy of Chechnya is the tragedy of Russia and the liberation of Chechnya is the necessary basic condition for the liberation of Russia. From it depends the democratic, civil and political destiny of Russia and of its relations with Western countries. Apparently, when Bush and US National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice speak about a "Russia firmly anchored in the West", they seem not to be aware of the fact that their silence on the Chechen conflict is leading Russia in exactly the opposite direction and how this is forcing Russia's political, military, juridical and mass medial system, dangerously towards an authoritarian involution. But not only the Chechen conflict is at the root of the weakening of democratic values. It is a broader attempt to introduce a "managed democracy" under a "dictatorship of law", how some ideologues call it, and which is after all simply the restoration of an authoritarian regime. Only few were able to note the discrepancy between the Check republic electing as president a former dissident, Vaclav Havel, and Russia which instead couldn't achieve nothing better than proposing its electorate the choice between communists and the lead of a former KGB colonel.

A typical example where this can be seen is in the field of press freedom. According to Michael McFaul^[27], Oleg Panfilov, head of the Center for Journalism in Extreme Situations, says that "the number  of criminal cases opened against journalists in three years of Vladimir Putin's rule is more than the number during the entire 10 years of BorisYeltsin's regime." Print journalists reporting the "wrong" news, especially about Chechnya, have been either intimidated, arrested or pushed into exile, and in some cases even murdered*. And according to the Glasnost Defense Foundation, 148 journalists died of "unnatural" causes in Russia in the past 10 years. Subtle but illegal tactics which resort to the manipulation of public's opinion are the most preferred and frequent practices. The best signs of this are the two largest national television networks that do Putin's bidding. His government and its surrogates have now wrested control of NTV, Russia's third-largest TV network and the only station truly critical of Putin. Many prominent NTV employees moved then over to TV6 in protest of the takeover, but that station was shut down again in a dispute with a shareholder, a government-connected pension fund. TV6 journalists then formed TVS with financial backing from a group of business executives loyal to the Kremlin. Nevertheless, this last nationwide private and partially independent TV station, was shut down too on June 22nd, 2003. Officially, suddenly and unexpectedly, the Russian press ministry explained that the "station's financial crisis and problems with staff and management made further broadcasting impossible".^[27b] The editor in chief of the Ekho Moskvy radio station, Alexei Venediktov, said the closing of TVs gives the government now a virtual monopoly on broadcasting. "It's like when all candidates are excluded from the election campaign, except for only one," he told. Replaced by a state-run sports channel, TVS gives now the Kremlin a firm grip on what goes out over the nation's airwaves. Short after, in August, the government took over also the country's most respected independent polling agency. Its polling showed that less than one-third of Russians support the Chechnya war. Actually, Reporters Without Borders ranks Russia 121st out of 139 countries in its worldwide press freedom index.

This is of course not the only mean by which the Kremlin imposes violently his diktat. Putin's attack on Yukos Oil Company, Russia's largest company and possibly the next world's fourth-largest oil producer is the best example illustrating how personal power and control over the country stands prior to every economic and financial progress. In early July 2003, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the CEO and principal shareholder of Yukos, was thrown in jail and charged with fraud relating to the 1994 privatization of a fertilizer company. Soon thereafter, Yukos and some of its employees were hit with charges of bribery, murder, and corruption, and Khodorkovksy himself was pulled in for questioning. But Khodorkovsky's real crime was his violation of an informal deal whereby Putin agreed to turn a blind eye to the questionable manner in which Russia's oligarchs acquired their assets as long as the businessmen kept their noses out of politics. He began to fund a range of parties for the December Duma elections opposing the Kremlin's policy. This move clearly sends a signal to every oligarch possibly ruminating on the idea to enter politics and oppose to the status quo.

Its no miracle that, despite his disastrous policy in Chechnya, his incapacity to control an endemic corruption, brutality and a criminal activity that plagues the federation and his unconvincing economic reforms, for Russians at least, which, except in the big urban and industrial centers, left substantially the poverty level unaltered throughout, Putin's popularity remains firmly anchored and finds no adversaries. Over 70% of Russians approve Putin's presidency. Because of this almost complete lack of press freedom it is easy to predict that, despite all, Putin will almost certainly win the 2004 presidential elections again. Certainly Western state heads will as usual warmly welcome Russia's "democracy" and Putin as the "legitimate representative of the Russians will", and explaining us that for this reason any harsh critics must be set aside.

Meanwhile the State Security Service, whose budget is dramatically rising, increasingly harasses human rights activists, environmental leaders and religious groups. Recently, the Russian government expelled the OSCE from Chechnya and terminated its agreement with other Peace and human rights NGO's or refused reentry to many personalities involved in humanitarian or journalistic activities. Also frauds in local elections or violations of electoral laws are a standard practice. The government interfered in electoral politics, removing opposition candidates from the ballot and preventing incumbents from seeking reelection in various regions of the country. The State Duma has become servile to the state head, and frequently unanimously welcomes Putin's policy almost in any occasion.

"Spy cases" are fabricated to revive the Soviet system of suspicion and reporting. The Moscow Duma revived for August 4 2003, the structure of agilers: street cleaners, house-managers and concierges are used again as informers for the police in every districts of Moscow and the best informers will be even paid salaries. This is an old soviet styled practice that has been resurrected because of the emergency situation coming from suicide bombings and other terrorist attacks. What is particularly noteworthy is that street cleaners and concierges are given the authority to detain everyone looks suspicious to them until the police comes.

A number of bigwigs forming a complex nature of Russia's parallel armed forces, law enforcements and intelligence services (the Defense Ministry, Interior Ministry, FSB, Emergency Situations Ministry, Justice Ministry and others), also known as the "siloviki" or "chekist", are gaining an almost complete control also on the social and political structures. In this atmosphere an increasing number of former secret service agents, often responsible of human rights violations committed in Chechnya or elsewhere, are escalating in the structures of the civil administration. Generals who stand accused of war crimes are being promoted to high political offices. While in many East European countries, former officers of the communist secret police forces are banned from holding public office, in Russia, a former KGB colonel is reforming the country and inserts KGB cronies in important positions. The FSB is running most of the organized crime, protection racket, drug trafficking, arms sales and contract killings. Instead of opposing this tendency, Putin, on the contrary continues in strengthening traditional Soviet power security agencies, improving their ability to work together and maximizing their resources. It is likely that a monster like the Soviet KGB will be resurrected in the next years. The FSB will also have its own massive armed forces, the border guards, with more than 100,000 soldiers, armor, an air force and a navy.^[28] While Putin announced the creation of this KGB-style super secret police, he did not propose, as it should be in a liberal, democratic and law abiding state, any public system for controlling its activities. Putin is in fact working hard to establish a semi-criminal shadow system of power. Olga Kryschtanowskaja, a sociologist, claims to be able to document precisely how thanks to Putin's "reforms" almost 80% of the leading positions in the Russian power structures are now again under the control of the old Soviet nomenklatura.^[28a] While in 1988 the Politburo had only a 4,8% of military presence, today, in the analog structure which is the highest "Security Council", they represent 58,3%. In the government the secret service personnel was 5,4%, but today they are about a third.

"The steady increase in the proportion of military and security men in the political elite over time is striking:

1988 (Gorbachev) 4 percent
1993 (early Yeltsin) 11 percent
1999 (late Yeltsin) 17 percent
2003 (Putin) 25 percent

A breakdown by various groups within the political elite in 2003 is also revealing: Proportion of military and security men in:

State Duma 9 percent
regional elite 10 percent
Federation Council 15 percent
federal government 33 percent
Security Council 58 percent"

The governmental control over the media and the reforms of power structures aimed at bringing to life something reminiscent of a police state are all in accord with Putin's doctrine that envisages to reestablish a centralizing control and the strengthening of the center at the expense of the true Russian Soul which is of regional identity and multiethnic nature. It is the doctrine of the "vertical power", as he calls it, which doesn't hesitate to put at risk individual rights and minorities in order to preserve a central and unique regulatory system against separatist trends and definitively abolishes Yeltsin's project of "asymmetrical federalism" (concessions of regional privileges in economic matters) which Yeltsin himself maintained only as long it could serve for his own personal political interest, as the case of Chechnya clearly demonstrated.

The media propaganda has become so effective that large parts of the public opinion do not only show unwilling in opposing the war in Chechnya, as it was the case with CW1, but even acritically support their own jailers: what about the fate of the (estimated) 80.000 Russian soldiers, mostly conscript youngsters (80% of the military casualties) compelled to take part in a conflict they never wanted and probably even don't understand? Large numbers of traumatized soldiers returning home remain without alternative employment and with no assistance. Apparently, Russian authorities do not only hide their own people the truth on what is really going on in Chechnya, and do not only massacre Chechens but don't even care about their own soldiers who are massively sent into a dangerous conflict where many of them will never return from. How could Russia's leaders have steered their country into such self-defeating wars, at a cost of thousands dead and wounded Russian citizens at all?

Meanwhile the state propaganda entered also in schools. New textbooks describe Vladimir Putin's figure as "young, self-disciplined and driven by tireless energy" praising his achievements and reforms. Teenagers are now required to study Putin's reforms for state history exams, officially approved by the Education Ministry, in a tone like that of the ol Communist Party songs. Among other things pupils must "list new evidence of Russia's rebirth" and read how good it was that Putin cracked down on the country's independent media and bringing it back under the control of the Government. A newly indoctrinated and servile generation like in the Soviet-era is coming up again.^[28b]

Correspondingly the hate against the West, especially against the USA, is escalating. Contrary to the popular Western belief according to which the USA are considered a friendly country by Russian's society (55% consider Americans as "a source of danger" but only 5% believe China is^[34]), it is likely that with one signal from the side of the leading political establishment a virulent anti-Western campaign would erupt on command. The Western conspiracy against Russia is the old leitmotiv of the former Soviet empire but it shows to be still very effective and convincing for many Russians. A military unwilling to reform, to give account of its actions and to be governed by law is still wrapped around the American threat and is not under democratic control. This can only reinforce the position of the armed forces, the special services and the bureaucracy.

Also other socioeconomic indicators don't open the way for any optimism. Hospitals and medical structures are collapsing and the economy, despite the progress of recent years, is far from having achieved a convincing and secure betterment: after the ruble's devaluation of August 17, 1998, incomes fall by 30% from one day to the other and without raising again since then. After the fall of the Soviet Union, abortion rates, characterized by a demographic implosion, together with the children mortality rate grew, more than 3,000 children fell victim to murder, and 94,000 children and teenagers suffered from various crimes^[38b] and alcoholism spread out (on the admission of the Russian chief of general staff Anatoly Kvashnin, as many as 10 percent of conscripts serving in Chechnya have developed a dependence on alcohol).^[38b2] Russia holds first place in terms of violent death rate and holds second place in terms of suicide rate in the world.^[38bc] The great and unique intellectual and scientific potentialities of Russia seem not to find a way to express itself. On the contrary some prominent figures of the Russian "intelligentsia" faithfully subscribe to Putin's brutal means in Chechnya trying to justify the unjustifiable under the cover of "national security". This, together with Putin's mass graves in Chechnya, represents not only a material but also and especially a psychological, social and cultural depression of a nation that can't find any new moral and spiritual point of reference. Meanwhile, Putin's originally promised two weeks "Blitzkrieg" in Chechnya seems to be eternal.

What remains are frustration and dreams. A frustration which instead of leading to a self-critical thought on the contrary tends to imagine all sorts of inner and outer enemies as the cause of every problem, and dreams which instead of searching for a new great Russian reforming project still imagine that the old authoritarian short cut might be the solution. Milosevic dreamt about a "Great Serbia". Bloody and devastating conflicts followed throughout the former Yugoslavia with the threatening and destabilizing consequences for Europe that anyone knows. The same spirit is incarnating now in a part of Russia's conscience which is dreaming again about an imperial centralism, a "Great Russia". Dreams of a supreme leader revitalizing the former Soviet Union go under the name of "patriotism". Reunification plans are being pursued. In Georgia, after the ousting of President Eduard Shevardnadze, Moscow has been increasingly openly supporting separatist regional governments. The new government in Tbilisi has clearly been given a choice: Bow to Moscow or Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Adzharia may by "reunited" with Russia. And the Caucasus is only one peace of the great puzzle the Kremlin has in mind.

But from history we know how every time a country begins to talk of becoming "great", bloodshed and ethnic cleansing followed. This increasingly aggressive neo-imperial policy of undermining neighbors and supporting corrupt, self-styled separatist fiefdoms is detrimental to true Russian national interests. All attempts to recreate the Soviet Union in any form will be adamantly opposed by most of the former Soviet countries themselves and the post-Soviet landmass could turn into a bloody mess just as the former Yugoslavia did under Slobodan Milosevic.

If the West will continue on this line it might find the former Serbian regime strong and healthy again in a future chauvinist Russia. And this time it will have to confront with a much more dangerous threat and with a much greater destructive force. And Russia is a threat not simply because of its power but especially because of its decline.

In Chechnya Putin's "dictatorship of law" produced only an absolute lawlessness. Authorities try to hide the real scale of the tragedy, through a pack of lies foisting on the public the idea of false patriotism and showing the unwillingness to listen to the opinion of those who seek for a nonviolent way out. The signs that there is a clear strategy to restore the nationalistic imperial past and that it is going to succeed are numerous. The political Russian establishment actually in power seems to be unwilling and culturally incapable to deal with internal conflicts and terrorism without undermining the fundamental rights and freedoms of its citizens. The restoration of an authoritarian, almost fascist regime, based on a desire of imperial reunification, unable to deal with its own citizens without restrictions on the media and on political activism, reminiscent of the worst features of the Soviet era, is now definitely under way. It sounds somewhat ridiculous to read in the Russian constitution that the President should be "the guarantor of the rights and freedoms of the men and of the citizens" (article 80-2). And despite all this, this is the regime that many Western authorities continue to welcome happily as the "new found Russian democracy". Is it not Western interest to avoid that Russia becomes a fascist KGB-military ruled dictatorship that commits Nazi-style crimes against humanity? Is it not Western interest to defeat this system which is already the main source of anarchy and mafia activity in its neighborhood?

Despite its present economic weakness and its disastrous results in Chechnya it would be a grave mistake to minimize the military power and the threat Russia can become in the near future again. True is that after the fall of Berlin's wall and because of its profound economic disparity compared to the West, a badly equipped and badly trained Russian military is no longer capable to keep up with the only left American superpower. But Russia has still thousands of nuclear warheads and today has more military personnel than the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Spain put together. In October 2003, Putin announced the national nuclear forces should be fundamentally modernized, warned that Russia does not dismiss the use of nuclear weapons in preventive strikes and against a "potential enemy." Moscow is considering an opportunity to implement the new strategy if NATO and the USA preserve their aggressive orientation. But there is not only its nuclear weaponry but also a huge conventional military force. There is a radical modernization going on of the entire military system. Russia is not planning to reduce the personnel of its armed forces to less than one million, as Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov has said. "Russia is reforming its Armed Forces and military organization in general given the new standard of political relations with NATO." "The purpose of the reform is to adapt the defense policy to the new threats and challenges," he said. According to P. Felgenhauer, an independent Moscow-based defense analyst, and columnist for The Moscow Times, the number of armed Interior Ministry personnel is more than 2.5 million. And there is no democratic control over the power and intelligence ministries which have only to obey to the Kremlin and have no duty to report anything to the Russian Duma parliament that hasn't any possibility to check what is really done by these forces covered by an almost absolute state secrecy. Felgenhauer observes^[38b2]:

"After the demise of the Soviet Union, Russia did not demilitarize or seriously cut the overall number of military personnel. The power ministries continue to be totally secretive and their activities remain out of the public's reach. Now it's clear that Putin does not want to change this situation. When meeting Western leaders, Putin often talks of the need for partnership and integrating Russia with the West. Inside Russia, Putin emphasizes his desire to recreate and reinforce a great Soviet- style military derzhava [great power]. These two faces of Putin seem to contradict each other. It's now clear that the Kremlin wants Western investments and technology to refurbish Russia's economy and double GDP, so that it will have money to rearm and recreate a Soviet-style global military machine that could in the future threaten the West. This is a strategy that was successfully employed by Josef Stalin in the 1930s - - Putin clearly wants to copycat."

Moreover, the Duma itself, approved the first reading of a bill on compulsory military education and training at schools and professional colleges. The idea to reinstate the old Soviet compulsory periodical training for students with obligatory teaching of elementary knowledge about defense and fundamentals of military service at schools and professional colleges resurfaced and is likely to be approved next. The reintroduction of the so-called "preliminary military training" to Russian schools has been approved with 338 deputies who voted for adoption of the law and only 42 against. The Defense Ministry continues to rely on teenage conscripts to fill the ranks of its armed forces and Russian education with its whole society is to be once again militarized as was during the Soviet era.

Turning blind eye on these matters means ignoring the return of dictatorship in Russia with all the drawbacks this might have on Western nations itself. Assuming that Russia can't any longer become a military threat for the Western civilization again is a bad miscalculation.

The reinstitution of Soviet-era public-life traditions is in full swing and Russia has almost returned to Soviet-style power. Because of a still tragic economical situation and the delusions following the initial enthusiasm after the fall of the Berlin's wall, Russians are now too passive and tired for any active resistance. Despite Russian's public opinion opposing the war in Chechnya favoring a political solution of the conflict, a movement asking for the end of the war in the form of an active support remains still weak. When in the world millions rallied against the war in Iraq, in Russia only few thousands went on the streets, despite opinion polls indicated clearly that the vast majority of Russians were against it. The critical state of society and the breakdown of the Soviet Union have particularly disoriented young people, who look for clear and attractive ideals but find none. In this emptiness they opt for social aggression or forms of chauvinistic hysteria. Radical nationalist authors and organizations are growing. People dream of a fast and robust imposition of law and order, even if through violent and authoritarian means, rather than a peaceful and democratic but long process of reforms. The coming of something and someone who has unlimited power and that should brings back discipline, or what Putin calls the "dictatorship of law", is felt as the primary social and political urgency.

One editorial example of this might be the right wing/nationalist journal Russkii Dom, where A. Savelev wrote:

"The risk of a war like that in Chechnya awaits us at every step we take to reunify the Russian world.... The risk of war is tied to aggressive "pan-Turkic" plans already having a considerable effect on the whole of the North Caucasus, Tataria, Bashkiria and other 'internal' republics in Russia. If we don't respond with a large-scale mobilization of the Russian population, as our state-forming nucleus, we can expect a long drawn out war on our own territory.... The key to Russia's victory in this war is a crusading army: 100 million citizens with military training, a 10 million-strong national guard and a mobile army of a million. Victory means being ready at any moment to use our nuclear weapons, tactical or strategic.... The Russian world faces a choice between oblivion and a profound reassessment of its values. The latter assumes the rejection of liberal principles that are alien to Russian interests (in both their Soviet and their 'democratic' guises) and a return to the traditional values of Orthodox civilization, which must be applied to today's problems."^[35]

The "rejection of liberal principles" mixed with an instinctive desire to use weapons of mass destruction is a tendency which seems to emerge from time to time. According to Matthew Evangelista^[36] who cites Andrei Piontkovskii^[37], short after the outbreak of CW2 there was a widespread sentiment in Russia that weapons of mass destruction should be used against Chechnya in response to the invasion of Dagestan and the apartment bombings. Among those who advocated such means were professional politicians who, in a seminar held in the Duma building, "were discussing in all seriousness the question of using thermonuclear weapons in Chechnya." They also included fellow journalists who argued for the physical destruction of the whole Republic with bacterial weapons, psychotropic nerve gas and Napalm. Evangeslista underlines also, and the author can confirm this through personal experience, how among the Internet users, who are considered the most progressive class of the Russian society, the proposal to use chemical or nuclear tactical weapons in the Chechen conflict is frequently advanced as the final solution to the problem. One only wonders if President Bush, who says to struggle against the proliferation of arms of mass destruction and for a new worldwide security system, is aware that he is de facto allying with a political establishment which, if not being an integrating part of it, is after all not so far away from these social and political ideologies.

Fortunately other Russians are well aware of the risks these kind of collective psychological forces can represent. Boris Gershunsky, head of the Center for Russian-American Studies, already warned before Putin's elections in one of his books^[38], that in modern Russia...

"...ideas of terry Russian nationalist prevail... in different variants and at different levels these ideas more actively, avalanche-like and steadily engulf the masses.... And that is a possible forthcoming tragedy of Russia and the entire world. Having reached the blessed land of desperate everyday life of Russians and in fact facing no adequate opposition in terms of cogency, bright, populist safe national-patriotic ideas have already filled the ideological vacuum which formed right after the collapse of the communist regime... At the end of the 20th century Russia... in the eyes... of in fact indifferent world considered it possible to directly kill many thousands of women, children, old people of the long-suffering, but recalcitrant Chechnya... Only a decisive and overall opposition at all levels and by all means to the growing threat of aggressive nationalism and fascism in Russia can avert the catastrophe."

Gershunsky goes so far in saying that there is a "loss of fundamental moral values of the Russian society" that "the Chechen war, no matter what the authority may wish, objectively gives way to neo-fascist and neo-Stalinist forces in Russia" and that there is a threat of a "return to tyranny" and the "nazification" of Russia.

Hopefully he will be wrong this time, but right is he in saying that "non-resistance to evil is likely to entail even bigger evil..." Unfortunately history does not come in our help to rise our optimism. There are striking similarities between the fifteen years of the German republic of Weimar preceding Hitler's putsch and the last dozen years of Russian history.

The Weimar Germany was not an outcome of an economic, social, political or cultural evolution, but was a more or less artificial artifact following a defeat in WW1 - today's Russia is not such a cultural outcome either: its the result of its defeat in the cold war. Germany lost after WW1 its colonies and some of its own territories in the East (and had also to give up Elsass-Lothringen to France) and the German society perceived that as especially humiliating, resorting to forms of nationalism - Russia lost the former Warsaw Pact countries and other former Soviet republics and the Russian society reacts now with forms of nationalism too. The emergence of fabulously rich businessmen, most of them with control of both media outlets and banks was one of the main reasons for the nazi propaganda against the "rich Jews" - Russia's oligarchs are the most hated men and may soon become an ideological target too (Gushinsky, Berezowsky and Khodorkovsky may be only the first examples paving the way for this). The German Mark experienced a terrifying devaluation in 1923 - in 1998 the Ruble encountered a similar crises. The worldwide 1929 economic crises struck in particular the German economy: millions fall in absolute poverty and material desperation - Russia lives in a desperate economic situation too.

But perhaps most important of all is the interesting fact that Weimar was a "democracy without democrats", as historians call it. The years following the Perestroika, and to some degree also the first years under Yltsin, we could see how in fact Russia's political system revealed itself to be a "democracy without democrats" too. The fast industrializing process of Germany did not lead to a correspondingly emergent democratization as in many other countries - the same for Russia. Two years after WW1, in 1920, a putsch had been attempted (the Kapp-putsch) on the Weimar republic and it failed - three years after the fall of the former Soviet Union, in 1994, the same happened in Russia. The practice to murder political opponents in the prenazi Germany was no exception - its a quite common practice in today's Russia too. In the Weimar Germany prevailed a national hate against the Western powers, and instinctively against its democratic values, because of its selfish and imperial policy while they were quibbling about the self-determination of the peoples - Russians are comprehensibly saying the same thing about today's Western powers. Already during the Weimar years in Germany Jews became increasingly demonized - the 20 million Muslims in the Russian federation (seven of its states have Muslim majorities) seem to meet now the same fate.

After fifteen years from WW1 Hitler came to power in 1933. Will history, fifteen years after the fall of the Berlin's wall (2004) or the fall of the Soviet Union (2006), repeat itself?

A new sort of "Stalinization" of Russia is under way. Putin has in fact created the necessary conditions for an authoritarian government and everything hints at the possibility that in his next presidential term we will see the totalitarian character of the new Tsar acting in all its power. However, those pragmatic Western observers and analysts, capable of foreseeing only short term advantages, seem not to realize this. They are hypnotized by the apparent Russian "democracy" and blinded by its politicians who show to be masters in imitating western institution while ignoring the substance of it. Still on September 27, 2003, President Bush stated: "I respect President Putin's vision for Russia: a country at peace within its borders, with its neighbors, and with the world, a country in which democracy and freedom and rule of law thrive."^[38a] The war in Chechnya had disappeared again.

But the Bush administration's shift of attitude came only few weeks later, to a meeting in London on Nov. 20 among Bush, Rice, Secretary of State Colin Powell and British Prime Minister Tony Blair. Powell, sources say,"^[38a2] raised the issue of Russia, saying that Putin's increasing authoritarianism was a serious problem. Blair said that while the context was important, Putin's behavior was indeed a problem -- and Bush agreed with him. Since then Powell has been methodically pushing the envelope of the administration's new willingness to publicly criticize Putin. Less than two weeks after the London meeting he chastised the Russian leader at a diplomatic conference in Europe for failing to meet treaty commitments for the withdrawal of troops from Georgia and Moldova. There followed his spokesman's condemnation of the elections.

Meanwhile almost all western media continued to pass all this over silence and didn't miss an occasion to report how this election might be a "key step toward peace" in Chechnya. Only when the OSCE and the CoE decided finally not to send their observers, few days before the elections the same media slowly began to realize that this was perhaps not the case and a more critical pronouncement surfaced. Finally it became clear how it might have been somewhat embaracing to back a sham Soviet-era style election which only made a mockery of Russia's pretence of being a civilized nation. Obviously Kadyrov won with an overwhelming majority of 82% preferences and a similar voting participation. The European commission, through the voice of Diego de Ojeda, spokesman for Chris Patten, suddenly wake up and doubted the elections were "free and fair". But added: "nevertheless, what is most important to us is that THESE elections somehow gain respectability or credibility -- or legitimacy, more accurately -- within the Chechen population", that after all one must regard "the elections as an internal Russian matter", and finally that what must be underlined "is the need for the majority of the Chechen population to agree and subscribe to THIS process."^[26j]

However, as we will see, despite this continuing double standard policy, the presidential elections in Chechnya signed a turning point and the beginning of a new and less friendly approach by the western powers towards Russia. The usual blind eye policy going hand in hand with a gentle smiling faces diplomacy went on, tough, from now on with some less intensity and conviction. A period of alternating and contradicting attitudes followed characterized by open condemnations first, followed by counter-order declarations which sounded almost as excuses.

This became particularly clear when everyone could realize how Europe still didn't touch the bottom. On the EU-Russia summit in Rome on November 6 2003, the Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, in an incredible defense of Putin's political and military actions in Chechnya, after telling that western journalists are giving a biased account of the facts, declared candidly how to the terrorist acts by chechen radicals "there has never been a correspondent response from side of the Russian Federation", that "a referendum was proclaimed, where not 10, 20 or 30 per cent of the population participated, but 80 percent of the population, and 80 per cent of the voters decided democratically to make part of the Russian Federation", that Russia is "a country which sees in democracy its present and its future" and finally added : "Therefore I, really, as friend of the Russian Federation and friend and personal cherisher of President Putin say: don't let us continue to spread out these fairy tales." In other words one of the most prominent western leaders, in the name of the European presidency, officially declared in front of dozens of journalists that the genocide in Chechnya simply doesn't' exist and is only a "fairy tale"!

Putin and Berlusconi at the EU summit in November 2003

This was the last straw, and Europe began to understand that it went perhaps too far. The European Parliament, through the voice of its President Pat Cox, had to disagree with Berlusconi's remarks. The EU Commission and the Danish and Swedish governments did officially distance themselves from Berlusconi's views too (however these were the only two European governments in doing so).

Short after, on the December elections for the renewal of the Duma, the rise of the ex-KGB forces and the neo-fascist forces became clear to everyone. Putin acquired an almost absolute power with 77% and the fascist oriented party of Zhirinovsky (LDPR) swear his loyalty to the president and addeded another 12% of the votes. The opposition parties experienced a great defeat. The communists got only half of the preferences compared to the former parliamentary elections of 1999, while the liberal parties as Yabloco and SPS were definitively annihilated and didn't reach the 5% barrier necessary to get a seat in the Duma. Meanwhile the Osce observers clearly confirmed that the election campaign was "free but unfair" and the existence of a "regression in the democratization progress" is real: the state propaganda for the pro-Kremlin parties, especially for United Russia, was omnipresent in the media and a systematic boycott of the opposition forces was reported. The way for the new nuclear KGB styled Tsarist Russia has now no obstacles on its way to the presidential elections in March 2004.

Colin Powell tried to intervene, tough much too late, somehow on January 26^th 2004. In a front-page story in Izvestia, one of Moscow's most influential newspapers, Powell said publicly what President Bush has been saying privately to Putin. He said the U.S.-Russian relationship "will not achieve its potential" unless the two countries share "basic principles." "Russia's democratic system seems not yet to have found the essential balance among the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government. Political power is not yet fully tethered to law. Key aspects of civil society - free media and political party development, for example – have not yet sustained an independent presence."^[26k] An angered reaction through the Russian press agencies came as an answer immediately depicting him as an arrogant liar. Evidently scared by the response Powell obediently changed his mind and fall back to the good old usual cynicism."The United States considers the fight against terrorism in Chechnya an internal affair of Russia", US Secretary of State Colin Powell said live to the Ekho Moskvy radio. "Chechnya is part of the Russian Federation and the solution of this problem is the internal affair of Russia", Powell said. "The United States is pleased with the results of the October 2003 presidential elections in Chechnya", Powell said at the U.S. ambassador's residence. This at least according to the Russian media controlled by the government. ^[26l]

The West is again "glad to be deceived", as Rachel Denber of Human Rights Watch put it during the same month of Powell's visit in Moscow. Denber warns:

"As Russian forces enjoy impunity for crimes in Chechnya, and as Russia has escaped any significant diplomatic consequences for such crimes, the Russian government may come to expect nothing less than international disengagement on human rights more generally in Russia. The Russian public may conclude that it is acceptable for the government to be unaccountable for its actions. This will stunt progress on human rights in Russia for years to come, as the government learns to simply dismiss criticism of its broader human rights record, confident that words, no matter how tough, will never translate into action."^[26m]

Almost at the same time, on January 22^th 2004, French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin, who only 10 months earlier said that "none of us should try to teach lessons to others", dared to contradict the official Kremlin version that in Chechnya a struggle against international terrorism was going on. Villepin stated instead that the Chechen "war" is not over and won. "Chechnya is in a state of open war, with its daily quota of dramas and its risks of destabilisation for neighbouring countries, from Turkey to Iran," de Villepin said."^[26n] A strange coincidence is that only five days later, Chief of the General Staff General Anatolii Kvashnin was awarded the Legion of Honor, France's highest decoration, in a ceremony at the French Embassy in Moscow. Kvashnin was Northern Caucasus armed forces commander during the first Chechen war, and therefore de facto the one responsible for the elimination of the first trance of 100.000 civilians in Chechnya.^[26o] Was the French embassy trying to excuse Villipin's embarrassing statements?

What can be done?

The conflict in Chechnya as the previous ones in the Caucasus, have been essentially the result on one side of a selfish power struggle in the Russian political and military establishment, still victim of an imperial, authoritarian and chauvinistic mentality, its geopolitical interests and the control of the oil resources, and on the other side the indirect consequence of Western silence and equally selfish short term interests. And with its cynic silence and alliance the West is doing its best to favor the development of a neo-fascist power which might turn Russia in a new threatening and dangerous dictatorship in the coming years.

Also those acting in good faith indirectly contribute to these state of affairs. During the four years of massacres and tortures the Council of Europe's Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) made six visits in the war torn republic. Now the slight suspect that slowly emerges is that the previous recommendations they made did not have any effect and that recommendations alone might not be enough. However, "humility" and "prudence" remain the keywords that come also from members of the CPT as Mr. Jean-Pierre Restellini, who in an interview to Radio Radicale^[38c], indeed acknowledges that they recommended Russia six times to refrain from the extensive use of torture without tangible results, and proposes that "if the situation in Chechnya should still endure for a long time one might question Russia's permanence in the CoE". But full of respect and fear for Putin's murderous criminal regime Restellini adds: "and I say that with great prudence and humility". And again: "It seems to me that the results of the referendum must be questioned and I say that with great prudence and diplomacy".

We would like to ask him how long must "a long time" be, and how much of this genocidal "prudence", "humility" and "diplomacy" is needed before other measures will be contemplated? The complete extermination of an entire population, perhaps?

Mr. Restellini's prudence reveals the subliminal psychological impact a (non recognized) Stalinist power can have on quite honest and dedicated individuals. He recommends that the acts of torture and the persons who commit it "must not be covered by the silence of the President" (we wonder if it has ever occurred him that Putin does not only cover but perhaps also order it?) His statements clearly condemn the abuses and violence occurring in Chechnya but his diplomatic and political attitude leads him to advocate nevertheless a CoE that, instead of creating an ad hoc tribunal for war crimes committed in Chechnya, should not "judge, sanction and process", but "find a political solution to this terrible war". "We should make the idea acceptable to the federal authorities to increase the number of persons and interlocutors with whom they agree today and discuss how to resolve the situation."

Great words, indeed. But how realistic?

The idea that there can be a political solution without a decisive pressure on Russia's government is doomed to failure. Europe's hope in a shortcut that might contribute to a political solution without putting at risk its own authority is futile. If there won't be a real and effective pressure which is not simply made of so called "recommendations", but also of condemnations and sanctions, then hardly anything can change. This strategy did not produce anything of interest with Saddam Hussein, the Taleban government or Milosevic's regime. Why should Putin be an exception in this? The more or less conscious strong and apparently immortal hope that the ex-KGB colonel might sooner or later show to be a democrat still works behind the scenes, and the lack of awareness of what kind of Stalinist and criminal mentality move these people is the missing link. "The federal authorities aren't able to liberate themselves from a logic of war for some reasons I don't understand", said Restellini.

His words are certainly sincere and honest, and he is not the only one. But Restellini is only one of the many examples we could make to elucidate a common way of seeing, thinking and acting which, also if in good faith, did so far only encourage and pave the way to one of the bloodiest wars in Europe since WWII.

An incredibly strong fear and reverence in front of the Russian giant is deeply engraved. The fear that open and strong critics might make things worse is what paralyzes the entire western diplomacy. The horror of Putin's wrath is what makes them freeze to immobility and the possibility of a political settlement engineered with thugs is the illusion with which they continue to justify their own inactivity, incensing themselves with an appearance of sage diplomatic humility and prudence. That "prudence" that is one of the roosts of the Chechen genocide.

But, despite this inhuman policy or issues like the torture and ill treatment of prisoners by US led coalition forces in Iraq, the West has never been so powerful in extending its influence in order to drive history towards a global democratization. It can impose with much more determination the observance of the humanitarian norms and the respect for international laws and rights also without adopting double standards or military interventions. However, there have benn only rare attempts to do so before 2004.^[38d] Some examples of the kind of action the international community can take are the following.

• First of all, generally speaking, if Western nations would like to avoid a future new cold war, without assisting helplessly to the Chechen whirl swallowing Russia's civilization and erupting a threatening nazy-style nuclear power, they must finally recognize that the only truly effective measure they can take from their side consists once and for all in setting aside their immoral silence, omission, absence, tacit assent, reluctance, cynicism, implicit alliance, complicity and dishonorably collusive role with the regime that is breeding this monster. The US, Europe and other democratic countries are not little insignificant political entities, but together form the actually leading political, commercial and military world powers. They can rise their voice and have the power to state clearly and loudly how truth stands. They can and and must do that in their own interest. This is the necessary frame without nothing durable can emerge. Only after that, one can be more specific in trying to imagine the different steps that might lead to a political solution.

• It should pressure on Russia to adopt the principles of liberty, democracy and the respect for human rights: this can be the sole guarantee for stability and peace. And this means the preservation of Western interests too. Western countries should think on longer terms and avoid short term unilateral advantages, which might bring to some momentary conquests but will, on the long run, fail to work for their own interests. The West should consistently strive to draw Russia into new networks of engagement while at the same time speaking unambiguously as to what it is that disqualifies Russia from genuine membership in the community of democratic states. Moreover, Russia's nuclear arsenal, chemical and biological agent stockpiles and expertise also make cooperation important to prevent their proliferation. Providing assistance for reducing nuclear threats, would give Russia the chance to focus on the social and economic reforms that his country so desperately needs. More generally, it should be emphasized that positive Russian action in the area of human rights will advance opportunities for its collaboration with Western countries, institution and organizations.
  
  
• A policy and strategy aimed at the encouragement of democratic and libertarian movements must be developed. The only way to avoid a new wave of destabilization can't be that to refuse people's right for self-determination, but must be that of opening Russia and the Caucasus towards democratization and "humanization", detaching the latter from the Russian influence. That would not only be an advantage for the Caucasian republics, but for the whole Russian federation itself. It is the lack of democracy, the rule of law and human rights which are the worst enemies for both.
  
  
• The democratic forces in Russia exist and, despite being actually in increasing difficulty because of the rise of nationalism and censorship in the media, they are quite relevant and can become very powerful and influential if the West doesn't continue to abandon them to itself. The West, instead of sustaining the single corrupt politician or the already established powers must try to ignite a genuine democratic process of reforms first of all by sustaining these forces and movements. A strong financial, logistic and political support of moderate political forces and liberal movements is more effective in guaranteeing Western interests than flirting with war criminals. Expand funding and democracy assistance to meet growing challenges in Russia should become a top priority.
  
  
• A direct political support to the existing true democratic individual opponents to authoritarian tendencies in Russia, democratic reformists or human rights activists is a primary necessity. These democratic figures who advocate legality, liberal reforms and the respect for human rights, can favor in Russia those psychological forces that have been set aside now almost completely by the ruling powers in every sector of society. They make part of an educated and culturally well prepared elite: Russia's intellectuals, artists, scientists, mystics, philosophers, etc. are the true Russian Soul opposed to its surface muscular and military appearance. One example for all might be the already mentioned outstanding Russian human rights activist and State Duma deputy Sergey Kovalyov, a former Soviet dissident, who served 12 years in Soviet labor camps for his beliefs and is today actively engaged as human rights activist. Another name might be the already mentioned Elena Bonner. Isolated and desperately alone remain the efforts of the rare journalist who try to awake the Russian conscience like Anna Politkovskaya. And these are only some of the many possible examples.
  
  
• Look for ways to cooperate in promoting stability in areas along Russia's periphery, working together to resolve frozen conflicts involving secessionist provinces in Georgia and Moldova, and promoting economic and political reform in Central Asia. Russian meddling in the former Soviet states, the lack of reaction by the international community has resulted in growing anxiety in the region. The region needs reassurance that the U.S. and Europe stand with the newly independent post-Soviet states and is committed to their independence, integrity and stability. It should also be clear that Moscow should stop ongoing attempts to subordinate Georgia and Moldova, and it should push for the withdrawal of Russian troops. Increased Western-Russian collaboration in Russia's vicinity should however carefully avoid Moscow's suspicion that it wants to limit Russia's ability to exercise influence along its borders for appropriate purposes and encircle Russia via a permanent military presence. It is not this the final goal the Western policy should achieve, but it is a stabilization in security and freedom for all the sides involved which should become a reality.
  
  
• The greatest weapon against authoritarian systems is truth. If the public opinion knows the truth, or at least a set of relative truths and different freely expressed points of view, it becomes the greatest threat these systems fear. Whereas an unaware public opinion which remains manipulated and subject almost completely to a governmental "truth" is the most effective and efficient weapon any dictatorship has against its own citizens, far more effective than its police and military power. And these manipulated masses have been frequently used as a threat against the external world afterwards. The West can enhance a mass awareness through a project of alternative "mass information" and "mass persuasion" backing internally the free independent non governmental organization and mass media or externally through a technological coverage as radio broadcasts, satellite TV, etc.
  
  
• In the economical matters Western governments should control that its companies operating in the Russian Federation will not contribute with their operations, either directly nor indirectly, to human rights violations and avoid corrupt practices. It should implement precise legal principles applying them to specific cases and industries as it does when these operate at home. Financial aids should be submitted not only to purely economic guarantees but also to some conditions on the respect of fundamental freedoms. Every dollar that is not strictly subject to these criterions is money that funds authoritarian forces that might, one day or another, turn its power against the donor states.
  
  
• Like in many Muslim countries it is this, together with the inexistence of any separation between religion, state and policy, which is at the root of war and the Islamic terror. The willingness, in order to buy their alliance in the anti-terrorism coalition, to permit human right abuses or overlook abusive behaviors of states which refuse any democratic reform mixing the religious with its juridical, political and military system, is a gift to the terrorists. Coming to aid of threatened Muslim minorities in the Balkans during the 1990s, demonstrating that the political ideals pertain regardless of religion, helped in extinguishing any Muslim fundamentalist tendency in this region. Therefore funding programs for moderate Muslims scholars and helping build liberal, secular schools so that poor children in countries like Chechnya have an alternative to radical madrassas may help as well. This is the only true "war" on Islamic extremism that Russia should be pressured for. But such efforts will be of little use if the West is seen abetting, without comment or criticism, the worldwide bloody conflicts.

Sergey Kovalyov	Anna Politkovskaya
Elena Bonner	Andrei Sakharov

The West supported Soviet dissidents. Today we see almost a complete indifference. For instance, Ronald Reagan's administration was not a champion of humanitarian initiatives. He did not hesitate in calling the Soviet Union the "evil empire". However, even some very modest efforts in the humanitarian direction produced interesting long term effects. Foundations as the National Endowment for Democracy, created under his administration, support today human rights organizations as Memorial which are influential in Russia. Interesting is the account of Michael McFaul who describes how Reagan personally met with Soviet human rights activists and how this dual-track diplomacy produced results: a few years later, many occupied positions of authority in a democratizing Russia, a change that had national security implications. Although Russia still possessed thousands of nuclear weapons, its intention to use them against the United States greatly diminished as democratic and market institutions took hold there.^[27] The present American administration instead turned away from this policy, as Faul describes.

"Bush's stance is perplexing. His new national security doctrine  declares the promotion of liberty abroad a U.S. priority. Tell that to Russian human rights activists, who feel alienated by the lack of U.S. encouragement. But democratic activists in Russia need more than words of support. They also need continued U.S. financial and technical help. At a minimum, budgets for democracy assistance, already minuscule, cannot be reduced further. Cutting assistance now, moreover, would send a terrible  message about U.S. staying power, not only to democrats in Russia but to those in Afghanistan, Iraq and Uzbekistan. Congress also has a role to play. Last year, the House and Senate overwhelmingly approved, and Bush signed into law, the Russian  Democracy Act, which establishes a minimum for democratic assistance to Russia. Budget cutters in the administration have found creative ways to meet these minimal thresholds by calling programs like high school exchanges "democracy assistance." This sleight of hand must not become law."

No threatening menaces are necessary to do that. Or to put it in Kovalyov words, when commenting about the war in Chechnya: "You wouldn't have had to use bombs, God forbid, or embargoes or even withdrawing ambassadors. All that would have been needed was to repeat in every speech: 'This dirty war has to stop."

Whereas today, the panic response that followed September 11^th and which led to a flouting of human rights standards, is showing to be counterproductive and hurting the anti-terrorism effort itself. The same people backed by Reagan's policy are again fighting for basic human rights and democratic practices in Russia -- and Bush seems indifferent to their fate. Amazingly, it has proposed drastic cuts in the amount of democratic assistance earmarked for Russia on the ground -- ironic in light of this evidence -- that Russian democracy is firmly enough established. This worldwide international indifference towards the forces trying to build free, democratic, civic societies and law-abiding states, remains the stumbling block. This sends a terrible message about Western powers, not only to democrats in Russia, but worldwide.

Wouldn't a return of dictatorship in Russia, a country armed with thousands of nuclear weapons, present a much greater threat than the current set of tyrants, including Saddam and Al Qaeda? The best defense against war, dictators and terrorism is the kind of society that's based on economic and political freedom, where they have a harder problem of growing and existing.

An increasing part of the Russian collective psyche still dreams of a grand design on the world. And indeed they will have one! They can deliver great contributions to the world as they have already done. Novelists and poets as Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, and Pasternak, or composers as Tchaikovsky, Shostakovich, Stravinsky, Prokofiev, Rachmaninov, or scientists as Mendeleyev, Lyapunov, Chebyshev, Pavlov, Landau and Sakharov are only some examples of the splendors of the past. Splendors that still exist in its potentiality. The West should help Russia to find its true identity and psyche, which however can not reveal itself if they persist in the attempt to return to old historical patterns of military grandeur.

Let us now focus on the possible measures for the Caucasian conflict. Possible measures might be the following.

• Again, the Western condemnation of Russia's crimes in Chechnya must be denounced loud and clear. USA and Europe tirelessly pretend terrorism to be condemned while, especially after September 11^th, they themselves do not take the same distance from state terrorism. This ambiguity must cease once and forever. So far this has not been the case. And as long this won't happen it is unlikely that the West will play any rule in finding a way out for a peaceful resolution.
  
  
• It goes without saying that it is in Western's interest to set Russia under pressure in order to obtain in Chechnya first of all a cease-fire, the access for humanitarian assistance, the withdrawal of Russian troops, the opening of consultations for ways of peaceful solution and the establishment of a permanent organization of internationally authorized human rights investigators and monitors in Chechnya. There have been some attempts in this direction but always in the frame of a background idea that this effort has to be pursued in a manner that shouldn't upset too much Moscow. This attitude devalued almost entirely this effort from the outset. Especially the opening of Chechnya to independent international observers, relief organizations, human rights NGO's and the press would be a decisive step towards peace. Because only if the world really knows the truth about what happened and what is still going on inside the borders of Chechnya a basis for a reconciliation can emerge. Only if the Russian society will become aware about the atrocities committed by its authorities and military forces it can open its heart and mind to a peaceful settlement without falling in a desire for wrath. Only if those responsible for war crimes from both sides will be known and publicly denounced will both find the courage to isolate and prosecute them. Information, knowledge and truth are the primary ingredients for the beginning of a serious peace process.
  
  
• The international community must once and for all accept the sovereignty and independence of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. Only the achievement of a statehood can provide Chechnya with security and enforce their legitimate rights and freedoms. If an entire population has been slaughtered for centuries by a power they consider as an enemy, they deserve an international recognition and right the for independence and self-determination. The prospect of de jure recognition of Chechnya will be a strong motivation for the country to undergo decisive democratization and demilitarization.
  
  
• An effort by the Western media through a much more intensive press coverage is necessary. The cynical silence of the Western media is one of the main reasons why the war continues and death squads operating in the Chechen villages can slaughter without impunity civilians in an almost absolute indifference of the international community and public opinion.

On this base further specific measures will almost certainly be necessary to establish a durable peace. We cite only a couple of these possible specific measures that have been put forward recently. History might of course take a different path, but they are at least significant examples.

• On March 3, 2003, Rudolf Bindig, the already mentioned PACE human rights rapporteur, apparently regretting his own past lobbying in favor of Russia's admission to PACE, advanced in a draft resolution^[39] the proposal to set up an ad hoc international tribunal for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Chechnya by both Russian soldiers as Chechen rebels. The response from the Russian side was immediate and furious: Bindig was labeled by Rogozin, Russia's PACE envoy, as "a frenzied foe of Russia" and said that "the draft cannot even be commented on - it must be rejected at once". Whereas Maskhadov (who already advanced this idea earlier), welcomed the proposal through the voice of his ministers. Apparently only one side seems to be afraid of the truth. The Chechen conflict is rooted in a society that is in a permanent state of lawlessness since many years now and an atmosphere of total impunity reigns throughout the whole territory of Chechnya. The failure of Russian's law enforcement and other governmental agencies in Chechnya to build an atmosphere of trust is amply evident. An international tribunal for war crimes and crimes against humanity is actually not only a moral duty, but also a technical and material necessity. The West has a diplomatic, political and economical power that could effectively pressure Russia to respect international law and to accept an international tribunal which is after all also in its own interest, because only a truly legal and scientific investigation can become an effective deterrent against Chechen terrorism and its abuses. As already mentioned, the West can, if only it wishes to do so, pressure Russia to open the Chechen frontiers to independent international observers that could monitor the human rights violations coming from both sides and provide a legal and technical support for an international tribunal. Opening the gates of Chechnya for investigations would among other things also pave the way to an incisive humanitarian help.

The problem is certainly not the lack of evidence and proofs of the direct or indirect involvement of Chechen but especially of many Russian military and political authorities in war crimes. This evidence is amply documented up to the highest ranks in the Kremlin. Only one example among many might be the evidence of the use of weapons of mass destruction. According to Felgenhauer "there is credible evidence of use of the so- called Heavy Flamethrowing System (TOS-1) - a fuel bomb land-based multiple launch delivery system, also known as "Buratino" among the Russian rank and file - against Chechen towns and villages during the winter campaign of 2000. The third protocol of the 1980 Geneva Convention strictly forbids the use of such "air-delivered incendiary weapons" in populated areas, even against military targets. [...] This strategy of victory by bombardment has inevitably lead to massive war crimes. In attacks on Chechen towns and villages Russian forces have not only extensively used TOS-1 (Buratino), napalm and fuel air bombs, but also "Tochka" and "Tochka-U" ballistic missiles that can fly up to 120 km and cover up to 7 hectares with cluster shrapnel on impact. The use of such mass-destruction weapons as aerosol (fuel) munitions and ballistic missiles against civilian targets was undoubtedly authorized by Moscow and may implicate the President Putin personally, as well as his top military chiefs, in war crimes."^[39b]

An international tribunal might become only the first step, but a truly effective springboard for a peaceful, law abiding and political settlement of the conflict. On March 7, 2003, the minister of foreign affairs of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, Mr. Ilyas Akhmadov, announced the presentation of a fundamentally new concept for a resolution of the Russian Chechen conflict, with the title "Conditional Independence under an International Administration".^[40] The concept provides for the establishment of a mechanism of international administration in Chechnya, with the purpose to prepare the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria for the adoption of the authority and responsibilities of a legally recognized, independent state. Something on the line of what the UN is actually doing in East Timor, Kossovo and seems to work so far. Akhmadov's idea can be summarized through his own words as follows:

• "The formula of conditional recognition – transforming Chechnya into a truly democratic and peaceful state via a transitional period of several years of an international administration - provides a way to resolve the challenge of satisfying Chechnya’s legitimate aspirations while simultaneously meeting Russia’s genuine security interests." The Chechen people should be offered a state of their own, via a transitional period of several years under an international trusteeship system, which would meet Chechnya’s legitimate aspiration and enable Chechen society to recover from the catastrophe of the last decade, while simultaneously satisfying Russia’s genuine security interests, as well as the interests of the international community, including Georgia.
  
  
• "An UN-sanctioned international administering authority has to be set up and charged with a speedy and effective implementation of democratization procedures at all levels, with the aim of preparing Chechnya to assume the duties and responsibilities of a legally recognized independent state. Economic reconstruction, demilitarization, structural reforms and the training of civil servants and police, among other things, will have to be given priority. The international community has acquired much experience in this field in East Timor, the Balkans and particularly in Kosovo, which could successfully be applied to Chechnya."
  
  
• "A three-sided structure consisting of authorized representatives of Russia, Chechnya and the international community, in the form of the United Nations, is required. To this end, the United Nations Secretary General should be asked to designate his representative to promote a political resolution of the Russian-Chechen conflict. Such a step by Kofi Annan would help to initiate the three-sided intermediary body and to facilitate and consolidate a peaceful solution to the conflict among national governments."
  
  
• "Russian troops and all government agencies will have to be withdrawn from the very beginning. Simultaneously, a three-sided deal should be crafted to find a compromise along the lines of an interim international force to be introduced into Chechnya. Gradually, a newly formed and internationally trained Chechen law enforcement body should replace the international interim force.With the issue of Chechnya’s final status settled, Chechnya will be motivated to meet its part of the challenge. Crucially, one of the most serious tasks will be to build a truly independent, effective and apolitical judiciary."
  
  
• "A sophisticated scheme for demilitarizing the country must be constructed."
  
  
• "Those who desire to relocate to or from Chechnya should be given the necessary economic and legal support for their transportation and resettlement. Likewise, the Chechen ethnic community residing in Russia should also be offered the same options. Given the scale of destruction, one of the first priorities will be to rebuild basic infrastructures and housing and to create job opportunities."
  
  
• "The prospect of the recognition of Chechnya, together with help in economic reconstruction and the immediate replacement of Russian troops with an interim international force, is likely to secure Chechnya’s assent."
  
  
• "The administering authority should make every effort to create conditions for the free and fair election of a new government as soon as practically possible."
  
  
• "Since the idea of conditional independence provides the international community with influence to shape the future of Chechnya and enables it to end the long and brutal war by performing democratic and market reforms, the formula clearly serves these interests of the international community."
  
  
• "Educational and training programs should be made widely available."
  
  
• "The trusteeship system will guarantee reconstruction, economic aid, the know-how and other assistance of the international community and by democratizing Chechnya, will help to get rid of those who have hijacked the Chechen cause for their own goals."
  
  
• Goal is an elected efficient government within a framework of functioning democratic constitution through a clear separation of powers and the system of checks and balances in union with a free market and the rule of law are unquestionably what Chechnya should become.

An utopia? CW1 has been defined by many as the "personal war of Yeltsin", and Putin pursued his personal ambitions constructing his prestige and political career on continuing the Chechen genocide through CW2. Therefore it is clear that Russia under the control of Putin, who stubbornly continues to refuse any political solution, has no interest to take these steps. One might regard this project as too optimistic if not altogether irrealistic and naive. But one should also recall that also Milosevic's trial in front of the Le Hague tribunal was considered as such. And now, after almost four years of war that didn't lead to anything, it is also evident that sooner or later Russian authorities will be forced to recognize that this war is unwinnable. There is a growing awareness among the Russian political elite and experts that a political solution to the conflict is unavoidable. Skepticism on this peace plan is only partially justified and has its roots not in Russia but abroad. Using again Akhmadov's words:

"...what really lies behind such skepticism is not so much Russia’s objections as the unwillingness of the international community to challenge them. And this is what needs to be altered. Both the United States and the European Union have sufficient means to change the numbers in Kremlin’s calculations, and they should use them. No one, of course, is calling for a military confrontation or the isolation of Russia, but the international community should reverse its apparent policy making its acceptance of Russia’s war in Chechnya conditional on Russia’s willingness to cooperate in other areas. The United States, the European Union and its member states should accord the Chechnya issue top priority in their relations with Russia."

And Akhmadov's proposal is only an example among the many someone can imagine.

History has shown us that the search for narrow unilateral advantages led to disastrous results. How much time and blood is still necessary to learn this lesson? In its own interest, the West, and in particular Europe must definitely decide to use all its strength and power to stop this senseless colonial and genocidal war in Chechnya: a crusade and a genocide which, apart from the Russian political establishment and some of its generals, the Chechen warlord, sheik or mafia gang, isn't anyone's interest.


Conclusion

We believe that these are not abstract political or philosophical ideals, but serious down to earth realistic and pragmatic matters of interest for the Western world. But still strong engraved is the conviction that these are instead all "emotional ideals" without any true effective, real and pragmatic power. Still strong is the belief that some miraculous shortcut for a planetary security system exists (e.g. a strategic missile defense shield or whatsoever) which can assure selfish and local short term interests to the expense of a global well-being, without having to pay a price for this afterwards. Even among the most democratic and liberal representatives, the belief in the power of arms and in relationships based on pure force, despite all, prevails more or less unconsciously over the belief in the power of ideals and principles.

But isn't just this the most unrealistic and ineffective utopia instead? The good old fear and distrust in the effectiveness of liberty, the democratic principles and values is still alive and wealthy in the Western mentality itself, which after all shows how unaware it is of its own true force and stability. The international community must display the courage to stand on the side of truth and justice even if that might lead to a temporary loss of influence, national interests and political or strategic stability. The courage to risk to offend other states and their ruling powers by denouncing the grave humanitarian breaches. The courage to believe that truth is more powerful, effective and convenient on the long run than short term shabby tactics. Only if Western nations will continue to remain loyal to their own principles of freedom and liberty, not only for themselves but also in their foreign policy and standing unconditionally on the side of justice, can an effective worldwide security system be born. A security system that any technological scientific or military machinery alone can't assure.

Russia doesn't need only economical and commercial support or, as during the cold war, the threat of weapons of mass destruction, but it needs a heavy "bombardment" by "arms of mass persuasion". The Caucasian region doesn't need new intelligence or military "anti-terrorist" operations, but desperately needs solidarity for its sufferance too.

At present, the West looks the other way and doesn't take any responsibility for Russia's collapse. It keeps silent for fear, ignores the warnings and shuts its eyes in the hope that everything will go away. But almost certainly history will not be so complacent. Sooner or later it will be forced to take its responsibilities very seriously and most probably by adopting dangerous and extreme measures only because it refused to adopt more mild and simple ones previously.

Despite its name, the so called "Realpolitik" is no new conception. It is the policy that almost every nation pursued since the times of the Roman empire. No system or state head did ever deviate from it except in the rare occasions where history forced them to behave otherwise. However, the times where every country could pursue only its selfish national interests, without taking into account the consequence this might have on a global scale are now rapidly coming to an end. In this epoch of globalization and scientific and technological postindustrial development, where the threat of weapons of mass destruction falling in the hands of uncontrollable authoritarian and criminal regimes is materializing, the old conception of "realism" and "pragmatism" is becoming increasingly unrealistic, ineffective and abstract. What characterized the 20^th century, and continues to hold for this century either, was the substantial failure of the belief that democratic nations, based on the libertarian principles, could form an alliance with criminal regimes which refuse such principles. The idea that coming to pacts with these authoritarian systems supporting them implicitly, through a silent assent and an undeclared complicity, in order to keep them in the sphere of a friendly alliance, didn't work on the long run. If the West wants to keep its democratic and libertarian nature intact it has no other way out than rejecting these regimes altogether with their murderous actions. Concessions to criminal regimes do only enforce them. The Western alliance with dictatorships has later always been used by them against it. If a friendly attitude with war criminals and state terrorists might pay off for a while, on the long run however it can't lead to a stable and enduring system of security. There are no political, diplomatic, commercial or military shortcuts: the evil can not be controlled, it must be isolated and destroyed.

A new fundamental conception and vision, a paradigm shift of international affairs must emerge and replace the traditional Realpolitik. A new humanism based on ethical and moral international standards and values of liberty, freedom, self-expression, self-determination and more generally human rights must replace the voracious imperial appetites of the great powers and the political agenda filled with innumerable little egoistic desires of the smaller ones. Its about something new, a new mentality and a different political national as transnational attitude and culture we must conceive. An attitude supposed to bring to life something that has been seen never before but that the global village is now slowly but definitely imposing with stubborn insistence.

The main difficulty consists in conceiving a strategy that shows to be able in uniting the sacrosanct pragmatic and utilitarian necessities of any individual, group, nation or collective aggregate with a long term vision capable to keep in consideration libertarian and humanitarian principles and values. And this is precisely the most difficult task one can ask from a diplomat, politician or state head. Their entire professional life has been based just on the opposite principles. A real psychological perception of solidarity and of human unity is absent. A perception and development of a psychological onness is after all contrary to the original motives that are moving them and to the very nature of the power structures they dominate. Because they based their entire political activity on the preservation of interests of one or another part, lobby or country without regard for the common global interests of the community as a whole.

In other words, what is becoming urgent more than ever, is the construction of a global civilization which is not founded on a more or less threatening equilibrium of brutal forces, military and nationalistic appetites or on purely commercial and economical relations, but on a more vast unitary vision of the human race where we realize that without justice being done a lasting worldwide security system in peace and stability will remain a vain chimera. Bush administration's decision to reject in May 2002 the treaty signed by Clinton establishing an International Criminal Court which is intended to bring war criminal to justice, might give the US a larger freedom in their military action but sends the wrong signal just to those state terrorists who they will sooner or later have to confront and will likely undermine its political credibility in the anti-terrorism effort, contrary to the belief which inspired originally this denial.

With the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 and especially with the fall of the Twin Towers in 2001, the old notions, conceptions and strategies of national and international security, which worked during the cold war, break down once and forever. The doctrine of a "mutual assured destruction", which balanced the two contending superpowers during the Soviet empire has now lost most of its value. However, so far no real new security conception took the place of the old one. Bush' administration, despite its obsession aimed at the establishment of a worldwide security system, could not conceive something which goes much further than the purely military option based on the doctrine of the pre-emptive war against those countries which form what he calls the "axis of evil". On the other side, other Western governments opposing this view, like it became clear for instance for France, Germany and Belgium during the Iraq crises, did not advance any really convincing political alternative either. Both sides represent apparently opposite points of view but are in reality today united in their silent complicity with other "evil axes" they approach with a servile and acquiescent attitude but they probably will be forced to confront with in a not too distant future.

Making the courage to speak out for justice and human rights, and not only economy and military power, the center of international relations is the only alternative. It will of course take time and we are far from having attained such intellectual and cultural maturity. And it is just for this reason that nowadays we find the world divided into two factions, one represented by those we called the "realpoliticians", cynical and without ideals, and the others, the so called "pacifists" who live in an abstract idealism without any real pragmatic base and a realistic political proposal. They are after all the two aspects of the same culture.

Our analysis and the proposed strategy suggesting what preventive measures can be taken in order to avoid future military escalations, might be an alternative or at least a complementary view which can unite the almost exclusively military doctrine with a still too naive political conception that envisages in a much too vague and still too confused manner the way towards peace.

The analysis we carried out so far focused on the conflict in Chechnya. However it is our opinion that in many respects it might offer also several suggestions valid for other conflict areas worldwide. The unwillingness of the West to challenge the situation not only in Russia and Chechnya but also in the whole African continent, the Arab states or in countries like China, Cuba, Vietnam, Burma, Laos and many other regions worldwide, endangers the post WWII achievements in the rights and freedoms of mankind as a whole. This was the central and leading Leitmotiv of this paper.

[19] "Evaluation of the prospects for a political solution of the conflict in the Chechen Republic", PACE, Resolution 1315 (2003)[1]. Assembly debate on 29 January 2003 (5th Sitting) (see Doc. 9687, report of the Political Affairs Committee, rapporteur: Lord Judd). Text adopted by the Assembly on 29 January 2003 (5th Sitting).

[20] "Chechen referendum backed by Alvaro Gil-Robles". The Associated Press Feb.15, 2003.

[21] http://www.chechenpress.info/english/news/02_2003/19/2.htm

[22] "Council of Europe won't send observers to Chechen referendum ", Interfax of Mar. 10, 2003.

[23] "Official outcome of referendum in Chechnya March 23", RIA-Novosti press release, 2003-03-27, 18:19.

[24] "The European Union today welcomed yesterday's constitutional referendum in Chechnya as a 'positive step'", Ahto Lobjakas, 24 March 2003 (RFE/RL).

[25] From a a RIAN press release, 24 March 2003, Boris Tarasov.

[26] "EU sees encouraging signs from Russia on Chechnya", April 15 2003, Reuters.

[26b] Interfax. Friday, Apr. 25, 2003, 9:23 PM Moscow Time. & "Chechnya: Council and Commission statements", External Relations (European Parliament, Strasbourg), 02 July 2003.

[26c] "Aslakhanov's concerns about the new amnesty", Gazeta.Ru, 16 May, 2003.

[26c2] "Chechens claim amnesty guarantees no pardons for rebels", June 26th 2003, The Prague Watchdog, http://www.watchdoz.cz.

[26c3] Cechnya Weekly: News and analysis on the crisis in Chechnya. The Jamestown Foundation, 26 June 2003, Volume IV, Issue 23. http://www.jamestown.org

[26d] "Russia's Putin vows to crush Chechen rebels", AFP, 16 May, 2003.

[26e] As cited in the Moscow Novaya Gazeta, No 36, 22 May 2003 by Anna Politkovskaya.

[26f] "Statement on the recent suicide attacks in Chechnya", the Cechen Republic of Ichkeria Ministry of Foreign Affairs, # 03-35, May 16, 2003.

[26fb] "EU-Russia Summit/Chechnya - EU Must Push Harder on Human Rights Says Amnesty", an open letter by Amnesty International, 28 May, 2003. - "Russia: St. Petersburg Summit Should Not Eclipse Chechen Suffering", Human Rights Watch press release, New York, May 30, 2003.

[26g] See for example: "EU pledges support for Russia's peace plan in Chechnya", AFP, May 31, 2003. - "Chechnya deal is praised during East-West love-inNick Paton Walsh in St Petersburg" by Nick Paton Walsh, June 1, 2003 The Observer & other press releases about the summit.

[26h] "Chechen amnesty attracts more non-rebels than insurgents", The Associated Press, September 02, 2003. & "More Russian military personnel than Chechen militants benefit from amnesty" RFE/RL Caucasus Report Vol. 6, No. 32, 19 September, 2003.

[26i] "Chechens fearful of Kremlin's men", by Dmitry Sourtsev, AFP, 16 September 2003.

[26j] "The European Commission says it doubts yesterday's presidential elections in Chechnya were 'free or fair'", by Ahto Lobjakas, Brussels, 6 October 2003 (RFE/RL)

[26k] Izvestia Journal, Monday, January 26, 2004. Translation on the Washingtonpost. com: "Powell on Russia's Relationship With the U.S.".

[26l] "Powell: first lies, now arrogance", January 27 2004, Timothy Bancroft-Hinchey. Pravda.ru - January 27th, 2004 (RIA Novosti correspondent Dmitry Panovkin) - January 27, 2004 (RIA Novosti), "Powell: Chechnya- Russia's internal affair".

[26m] "Glad to be Deceived": the International Community and Chechnya", by Rachel Denber, Human Rights Watch, January 2004.

[26n] "French FM says 'open war' still raging in Russia's Chechnya", Friday Jan 23, AFP.

[26o] General staff chief gets French medal as media says his days are numbered. RFE/RL NEWSLINE Vol. 8, No. 17, Part I, 28 January 2004

[26p] "EU/Russia: For more coherence and resolve in EU/Russia dialogue" - 26/02/2004 (Agence Europe).

[27] "US Ignores Putin's Assault on Rights", by Michael McFaul, Los Angeles Times February 2, 2003.

[27b] "Kremlin shuts down major private Russian TV station", AP, June 22nd, 2003.

[28] "KGB: Big, Bad and Back?", by Pavel Felgenhauer, The Moscow Times, March, 13, 2003.

[28a] JRL Research and analytical supplemente. Issue No. 20 January 2004 Editor: Stephen D. Shenfield shenfield@neaccess.net. "Putin's generals"
SOURCE. Olga Kryshtanovskaya and Stephen White, Putin's Militocracy, Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 19, No. 4, October-December 2003, pp. 289-306.

[29] "Discrimination on grounds of race", Amnesty International, 19 Mar 2003, Media Briefing, AI Index: EUR 46/022/2003.

[31] "Moscow minister backs colonel who killed girl", The Telegraph, by Marcus Warren in Moscow. May, 9, 2001 & "Defense Minister says Budanov 'a victim of circumstances' ", RFE/RL Newsline, vol. 5, no. 94, pt.1 - May 17, 2001 & "Humanoids to be held liable in Mozdok blast", by Yelena Shishkunova, Gazeta ru, 13 August, 2003.

[32] "Is Troshev Feeling Stressed?" The Moscow Times, Pavel Felgenhauer. June, 8, 2001.

[33] "Russian general brands his men drunken looters", by Marcus Warren in Moscow, The Telegraph. June, 20, 2000.

[34] "The Caucasus and 'Caucasus Phobia' ", Rosbalt, 18/12/2002, Zinaida Sikevich.

[35] Russkii Dom, no 5, 2001, p. 9, no. 8, 2001, p. 44-5 (cited from The Jamestown Foundation Russia and Eurasia Review Volume 2, Issue 2 January 21, 2003 A NEW NATIONALITY POLICY OR A NEW SETBACK FOR RUSSIA, by Zaindi Choltaev).

[36] "The Chechen Wars. Will Russia go the Way of the Soviet Union", Matthew Evangelista, Brookings Institution Press, 2002.

[37] "Russia Heaps Nuclear Hate on Russia", Andrei Piontkovskii, Moscow Times, September 23, 1999.

[38] Boris Gershunsky, "Will President Putin save Russia?", Riga. As cited in the Chechen Times, No. 6 (31.01.2003).

[38a] From a White House press release. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/09/20030927-2.html

[38a2] "Speaking Truth to Putin", by Jackson Diehl Monday, February 2, 2004; The Washington Post.

[38b2] AFP, 27 January 2004. "Russian army chief launches anti-alcoholism campaign"

[38b] "Crimes against children on the rise in Russia", Interfax [25.5.2003 10:12 MSK]

[38bc] "Russia rated world's most dangerous country", by Ivan Afanasyev, 10 Nov. 2003, Gazeta ru.

[38b2] "Russia Does Not Dismiss the Use Nuclear Weapons in Preventive Strike", 08 October, 2003. Pravda & "Russia wont' reduce its army personnel to less than 1 mln" Oct 10 2003, Interfax & "Putin in Stalin's Footsteps", by Pavel Felgenhauer, The Moscow Times. July 31, 2003.

[38c] Interview on Radio Radicale (http://www.radioradicale.it) with Jean-Pierre Restellini, member of the Council of Europe's Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. July 25, 2003.

[38d] And, as far as I'm aware, only at the end of 2003 some serious analysis emerged. See for instance: Statement by Senator John McCain on the Situation in Russia (November 4, 2003) - Catastrophe in Chechnya - Escaping the Quagmire, by Zbigniew Brzezinski, American Enterprise Institute (December 10, 2004) - and especially A Crossroads in U.S.-Russia Relations, by Mark Brzezinski, Center for American Progress (December 19, 2003).

A Crossroads in U.S.-Russia Relations by Mark Brzezinski, Center for American Progress December 19, 2003

[39] PACE Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights provisional draft recommendation on war crimes tribunal. 3 March 2003. Rapporteur: Mr Rudolf Bindig, Germany, Socialist Group. http://assembly.coe.int//communication/TemporaryDocs/HR_situation_chechen_provrep_030303.htm

[39b] Crimes of War Project: "The Russian Army in Chechnya", by Pavel Felgenhauer, April 18,2003. http://www.crimesofwar.org/chechnya-mag/chech-felgenhauer.html

[40] "The Russian-Chechen Tragedy: the Way to Peace and Democracy- Conditional Independence under an International Administration", the foreign minister of the Republic of Ichkeria, IlYas Akhmadov, February 2003. http://www.chechnya-mfa.info/print_news.php?func=detail&par=68

[41] "La guerre de Tchétchénie ou l'irrésistible ascension de Vladimir Poutine", Jacques Allaman, George Editeur.

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