Did
Georgia and Russia make a deal over Ajaria?
By Khatya Chhor, Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty Prague, 19 May 2004 (RFE/RL)
EURASIA VIEW
Freelance journalist Elizabeth
Owen, a specialist in political affairs in the Caucasus, says as
Georgia and Russia pursue
rapprochement, Chechen refugees in Pankisi Gorge "are reporting
increased
police harassment and a growing
sense of insecurity." The Chechens have asked to be re-settled in
the West.
The Kremlin has recently
renewed its demands that Georgia take action against suspected Chechen
militants in Pankisi. Owen says
many Chechens believe Georgia will accede to the request "as part
of a quid pro quo for Russia's
cooperation with [Georgian] President Mikheil Saakashvili's
administration on Ajara."
Moscow refrained from intervening as the standoff between Tbilisi and
Adjara's erstwhile leader,
Aslan Abashidze, a Kremlin ally, played out in recent weeks. Owen says,
following the 9 May
assassination of Chechnya's Russian- backed President Akhmed-hadji
Kadyrov,
"Moscow is unlikely to ease its
pressure on the Georgian government to contain the perceived
Chechen threat."
Tbilisi has reestablished its
authority in the gorge in the past two years, but the area "is still
burdened with a reputation as a
haven for terrorists and Islamic militants." Georgian officials
"insist that their Pankisi
crackdown aims solely to root out militants and Islamic radicals." But
Owen remarks that Chechen
rebels often live among, or have connections to, ordinary civilians.
This
makes it hard for security
forces to identify the separatists and complicates efforts to root out
militants while leaving
refugees undisturbed.
Copyright © 2004 RFE/RL,
Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty,
1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W.
Washington DC 20036. www.rferl.org
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DID RUSSIA AND GEORGIA MAKE A
DEAL OVER AJARIA? 5/19/04 A EurasiaNet commentary by Irakly Areshidze
Aslan Abashidze's peaceful
departure from power in the Georgian territory of Ajaria marks a
significant victory President
Mikheil Saakashvili and his effort to reunify the country. At the
outset of the Tbilisi-Batumi
confrontation, few believed that it would end without violence. Many
were also surprised to see
Russia cooperating with Georgia in convincing Abashidze to leave for
Moscow. Some observers continue
to wonder whether Tbilisi granted any concessions to Russia in
exchange for Moscow's
assistance in resolving the Ajaria crisis. As the Tbilisi-Batumi
confrontation played out in
early 2004, Georgia came close to civil war on several occasions. Given
that Tbilisi had strong legal
grounds for pursuing a military option to restore control over
Ajaria, several of
Saakashvili's advisors reportedly pressed him to resort to force. There
was a
strong desire in some political
circles in Tbilisi to demonstrate the effectiveness of four new
US-trained Georgian army units.
At first, violence nearly broke
out when Ajaria's illegal armed forces prevented Saakashvili from
entering the region on March
14. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Had it not been
for the prudent refusal of
US-trained military officers to participate in a military operation, the
crisis might have taken a
violent turn then and there. The Georgian president himself sent
contradictory signals on the
question of an armed solution. His rhetoric was often confrontational,
even though he several times
ruled out the use of force. Pressure from the United States on
Saakashvili's administration
reportedly helped keep the peace during the confrontation.
Russia perhaps played an even
more important role in preventing violence. Indeed Russia's stance on
Ajaria caught many Tbilisi
political analysts by surprise. Moscow has a reputation of being a
meddler, rather than mediator
in Georgian domestic affairs, frequently manipulating separatist
movements in Georgia to weaken
the central government in Tbilisi. For example, during the 1992-93
armed conflict in Abkhazia
(another of Georgia's separatist Black Sea provinces), Russian military
support for the separatists was
instrumental in the Georgian defeat. During the Ajaria crisis, most
regional analysts feared that
Russia might try to protect Abashidze. In the event of a conflict,
some thought Moscow might lend
Abashidze troops and weapons from the Russian military base in
Batumi, or supply mercenaries
to fight on his behalf, like it did in Abkhazia.
Russian President Vladimir
Putin confounded expectations. Instead of trying to set Russia up as the
arbiter of the Ajarian
question, and thus increasing Moscow's leverage over Tbilisi, Putin
worked
with Saakashvili to ease
Abashidze out. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. On the
surface, such action by Putin
seemed to run counter to Russia's interests in the Caucasus, as the
outcome enhanced Georgia's
sense of cohesiveness, making it harder for the Kremlin to exert
influence over the country.
Russia's unexpected behavior is
prompting some in Tbilisi to ask whether a deal has been struck
between Saakashvili and Putin?
If yes, what is the concession that Moscow obtained in return for
its help on Ajaria? The
Georgian government insists no deal was made. Meanwhile in Moscow,
Russian
leaders have spoken about their
alleged desire to start a new, friendly relationship with Georgia.
Officials in Tbilisi view
Russia's cooperation on Abashidze as proof that Putin is serious.
Unfortunately, this scenario
sounds too good to be true.
Russian National Security
Council Secretary Igor Ivanov, the man who brokered the terms of
Abashidze's exile, also served
as the midwife for the new Georgian administration during the Rose
Revolution. As a repayment for
Putin's help, after taking office Saakashvili backtracked on a
number of longstanding Georgian
positions vis-à-vis Russia. In February, while visiting Moscow,
the
Georgian president agreed to
joint patrolling of the Georgian-Russian border in an effort to
contain Chechen militant
incursions. Saakashvili also retreated on a demand that Russia quickly
close down its two remaining
military bases on Georgian territory.
This fall, Putin and
Saakashvili hope to sign the long-delayed framework agreement between
the two
countries. This treaty would
finally determine the future of Russian bases in Georgia. In early
May, Georgian Foreign Minister
Salome Zurabishvili confirmed reports that Moscow, in return for its
military withdrawal, is seeking
a guarantee that Tbilisi will not permit another foreign country to
establish a military base on
Georgian territory once Russian forces are gone.
Russia has long feared that
American forces will move in after Russian troops leave Georgia, and
Moscow appears determined to do
its utmost to prevent this scenario from unfolding. Yet, it would
be absurd for Georgia to agree
to such a demand, given that such a commitment would undermine
Tbilisi's efforts to integrate
into Western economic, political and security structures, especially
NATO.
Some experts in Tbilisi worry
that a Georgian no-US-base guarantee was the cost of Putin's
cooperation on Ajaria. Stoking
such concerns is the fact that Zurabishvili did not immediately
reject Russia's base demand
during her early May visit to Moscow; instead, she declared that that
Tbilisi needed to consider this
idea.
Editor's Note: The author is a
political analyst based in Washington and Tbilisi. Views expressed
in this article are his own.
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