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RFE/RL Friday, 24 June 2005 Chechnya: Does Outrage Over Borozdinovskaya Sweep Presage Change Of Russian Tactics? By Liz Fuller On one level, the Russian authorities' outraged response to the sweep operation in the village of Borozdinovskaya in northeastern Chechnya on 4 June that triggered the exodus to neighboring Daghestan of several hundred local families appears to be a laudable, if exceptional and somewhat belated, acknowledgement of the arbitrary suffering inflicted on local noncombatants during the past six years of fighting. Russian presidential envoy to the Southern Federal District Dmitrii Kozak, who met in Grozny on 22 June with a delegation from Borozdinovskaya, termed the sweep operation, in which one villager was killed and 11 abducted, "an act of sabotage directed against Chechnya, Daghestan, and Russia," and he vowed that those responsible will be apprehended and punished. But there are grounds for suspecting that Moscow cares no more for the victims of the Borozdinovskaya sweep than for those targeted in hundreds of similar punitive actions and, in fact, plans to use the opportunity to neutralize a Chechen fighting force that in the past has crossed swords with Chechen First Deputy Prime Minister Ramzan Kadyrov. Why else should Moscow decry the Borozdinovskaya sweep when it has rationalized hundreds of previous such raids on the grounds that they are a necessary component of the "war on terrorism"? The population of the village of Borozdinovskaya are mostly Avars who resettled there from Daghestan in the 1950s. According to "The Moscow Times" on 23 June, local Avar strongman Sharap Mikatov created his own informal militia to protect the village from Chechen gangs, including one headed by Sulim Yamadaev, a Chechen field commander based in Gudermes who fought from 1994-96 on the side of the Chechen resistance but switched to the Russian side at the start of the second war in 1999. Mikatov's death in a shootout in 1998 left the village vulnerable to attack by pro-Moscow Chechens, and some Borozdinovskaya residents have told Russian journalists that they believe the Chechen-speaking perpetrators of the 4 June sweep were members of the Eastern Battalion of the 42nd Division of the Russian Army, which is commanded by Yamadaev and is reportedly directly subordinate to Russian military intelligence (GRU). Others even claim to have identified Yamadaev's head of intelligence, Khamzat Gairbekov, among the attackers, "The Moscow Times" reported. Speaking at a press conference in Makhachkala on 21 June, Daghestan Security Council Secretary Akhmednabi Magdigadjiev identified the attackers as "a Defense Ministry special unit...consisting mainly of residents of Chechnya," Interfax reported. "These are people with authority, wearing uniforms and with weapons, fulfilling a mission to discover and destroy militant formations and terrorists," Magdigadjiev added. That description could, however, equally apply to members of the presidential security force that is loyal to Chechen First Deputy Prime Minister Kadyrov, "Vremya novostei" noted on 20 June. Kadyrov's men have reportedly clashed on at least one previous occasion with Yamadaev's, and earlier this year Kadyrov dismissed all police officials Yamadaev appointed in Chechnya's southern Vedeno Raion, Russian journalist Anna Politkovskaya pointed out in "Novaya gazeta" on 24 February. Politkovskaya also notes that the Yamadaev-Kadyrov standoff by extension pits Russian military intelligence against the Federal Security Service, in which Russian President Vladimir Putin made his early career. Kozak's 22 June pledge to crack down on abuses committed against civilians in Chechnya may prove to be nothing more than a pretext to get rid of a Kadyrov foe in the run-up to the Chechen parliamentary elections tentatively scheduled for late November. Some Russian observers have already predicted that the new legislature will consist exclusively of deputies selected for their loyalty to Kadyrov. http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/6/487F4546-26F3-4A08-BB79-E72166328B8D.html From the Chechen Society newspaper, # 12(50), June 21-24, 2005 The Right to be a Refugee On the eve of the ‘professional’ holiday “Universal Day of Refugees” (20 June), refugees from places of temporary relocation in Chechnya complain about harsh living conditions. Migration officials disclaim accusations. By Elina ERSENOEVA More than five years have passed since the beginning of the second Chechen campaign and the words “refugees” and “temporary settlers” are to this day related to our republic. Returning after the war from the neighboring Caucasian regions, Chechens having lost everything can not in any way demand their legal rights in the motherland. Living in PTRs, they don’t receive their due monetary funds, basic provisions or medical aid. PTRs are places of temporary relocation, an invention of Chechen and Ingush migration officials. As a rule, PTR buildings are former dormitories adapted for the Chechen refugees returning from Ingushetia. The living conditions in Chechnya’s best PTRs leave a lot to be desired: cramped rooms, shortage of food and medical supplies, unsanitary conditions, lack of cultural development for children, etc. The main explanation is that the people in these lodgings occupied them in a terrible rush. In 2003-2004 the problem of returning refugees from Ingushetia to Chechnya was more political than social. The existence of tent-camps in Ingushetia called into question the claims that the situation in Chechnya was normalizing and that there was the possibility of a peaceful life there. Promising refugees fast payment of compensations for destroyed homes, migration officials resettled the tent-camp habitants to PTRs in Chechnya. After which, the officials happily forgot about the refugees – so say the refugees themselves. There are currently 32 PTRs and 10 PCLs (places of compact living) in Chechnya. About 6,500 families inhabit them. That is to say, more than 37,000 people out of the total number of 250,000 refugees (figures according to human rights center ‘Memorial’). Speaking with many people who live in the dormitories, one hears the same complaints –the administration, the difficult circumstances of living, shortage of alimentation. Lacking the ability to work (for one reason or another), they must sell half of the humanitarian aid they receive in order to provide themselves with necessary products. But since aid has not been distributed for the last two months, many order foodstuffs on credit from nearby stores. The buyers from PTRs owe several thousand rubles total. “And they pay us with nothing!” – an unhappy woman exclaimed with indignation. “Neither we nor our husbands work. When they convinced us to return from tent-camps in Ingushetia, they promised ‘golden mountains’, but now they cannot provide even the most necessary items. Even for a piece of land in exchange for a lost house, which they must give quickly and without charge, they unofficially demand from us 80-100,000 rubles”. However, official representatives of the PTRs put forward their version of the events. According to them, many habitants having received compensation payments for destroyed homes and already returned to new homes, do not want to hand over in rent of a room in PTR. They take enough humanitarian aid and all complain that they have nothing. A playground was built for the children, but the kids themselves destroyed it. For example, Assistant to the Commandant of PTR No. 24 Isa Dalaev (incidently, the Commandant is Maisa Dadashevna Alkhanova and it is practically impossible to find her in the workplace) said: “Yes, humanitarian aid was definitely not received for the past two months, but it’s not our fault, rather it is the fault of the humanitarian organizations. Recently, almost no one helps us except the Migration Service of the Chechen Republic. And the PTR inhabitants themselves love to exaggerate. Why is it that, for some reason, hardly any of them have admitted to receiving compensation (some of them even for homes in fine condition), but hold onto the dormitory rooms? Because, they want us to appropriate pieces of land as well. This although Uvais Deniev, the Curator of PTRs [UDM] clearly explained that plots of earth will only be given to those who lived in hotels or dormitories before 1994 and who have proof of this in their passports.” Well Mister Deniev obviously forgot that these passports were long ago exchanged for a new version. That’s how the former forced migrants live – they don’t know their legal rights and duties. Through all truth and falsehood, they endeavor to survive today’s tough times. Meanwhile, the propertied powers can find no time to pay the necessary attention to former refugees and inform them of their duties and rights. Translated by Sarah SLY "Chechen Society" newspaper, #12, 21-24 June 2005 http://www.chechensociety.net/ 17:52 GMT, Jun 26, 2005 Refugees will return to their homes in Chechnya - Putin envoy MOSCOW. June 26 (Interfax)- The people from the village of Borozdinovskaya now living in a tent camp in Dagestan will return to their homes, presidential envoy to the Southern Federal District Dmitri Kozak believes. "There is no chance of no return. The only key to the situation is a homecoming," he said in a Sunday night TV interview. He found it premature to say who was to blame for what happened and described the current investigation as objective and dynamic. In Kozak's opinion, the main task now is to return people of Borozdinovskaya to their homes. "Nothing threatens people who will go back there," he said. He said that a Chechen police unit has been deployed in Borozdinovskaya to guarantee security and "the best police officers have been assigned there." He said the unit will be probing the developments and protecting local residents against provocations, Kozak said. Official: Chechen wars killed 300,000 Sunday 26 June 2005 About 300,000 people have been killed during two wars in Chechnya over the past decade, a senior official in the province's Moscow-backed government said. Dukvakha Abdurakhmanov, a deputy prime minister in the Kremlin-controlled Chechen civilian administration, also said on Sunday that more than 200,000 people have gone missing. Abdurakhmanov's claim could not be independently verified. The Russian government has not revealed any casualties among civilians in Chechnya during the two wars in the region since 1994. Casualty estimates vary widely, but many say about 80,000 civilians - 40% of them children - died in the first Chechen war. Countless more have been killed since the conflict exploded again in 1999. Abdurakhmanov made the statement during a visit to the neighbouring province of Dagestan, where more than 1100 ethnic Avar residents of a Chechen village fled after one villager was killed and 11 others went missing during a recent raid they blamed on Chechen security forces. Chechen wars Abdurakhmanov and other Chechen officials were trying to persuade the refugees to return home, arguing that Chechens had suffered much greater losses throughout the conflict. The high casualty figures Abdurakhmanov cited could be part of a pitch to push the reluctant residents of the village to come back rather than a product of a thorough calculation. "You lost 11 people, while every resident of Chechnya has scores of relatives who have been killed or gone missing," Abdurakhmanov told the village's residents. Russian forces pulled out in 1996 after a disastrous 20-month battle with separatist rebels, leaving Chechnya de facto independent. The Russian army swept in again in 1999 after Chechnya-based fighters made incursions into Dagestan and after 300 people died in apartment bombings blamed on the separatists. Agencies Source: European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) Date: 24 Jun 2005 Guidelines on the treatment of Chechen internally displaced persons (IDPs), asylum seekers and refugees in Europe KEY CONCLUSIONS AND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1. The European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) is a network of 78 organisations in 30 European countries. In this paper ECRE has compiled the views of its member agencies, many of whom work with Chechen refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in European countries of asylum and/or in the Russian Federation. 2. These guidelines are a response to the high number of Chechen (1) refugees currently in Europe and the fact that some states are denying these refugees international protection on the grounds that they would be safe elsewhere in the Russian Federation. They include the latest developments in the Chechen Republic (hereinafter Chechnya) and the Russian Federation as well as information on the situation for Chechen asylum seekers and refugees in other European countries. 3. These guidelines concern the treatment and voluntary return of IDPs in the Russian Federation. They also concern Chechen asylum seekers and refugees in European countries, including EU Member States, in particular in terms of effective access to the asylum procedure and return. In relation to the latter the guidelines concern the voluntary repatriation of Chechens who have refugee or subsidiary protection status, those with temporary protection status and those who are in the process of applying for protection, including those who have received a negative first decision and have appealed. They also concern the mandatory return of Chechens whose applications have failed, and those whose protection status has ceased or ended after they had effective access to the asylum system. 4. Since 2003 asylum seekers from the Russian Federation (presumed to be primarily of Chechen origin) have become one of the largest groups of asylum seekers in Europe and other industrialised countries. (2) 5. UNHCR has stated that all those Chechens whose place of permanent residence was the Chechen Republic prior to their seeking asylum abroad should be considered in need of international protection, unless there are serious grounds to consider that he or she is individually responsible for acts falling within the scope of Article 1F of the 1951 Convention relating to grounds for exclusion. (3) 6. Reports from NGOs and international organisations continue to emphasise that Chechnya remains extremely unsafe (4) and that violence and widespread human rights violations have spread to Ingushetia. Meanwhile there continue to be severe obstacles to the physical, material and legal safety of Chechens in many other regions of the Russian Federation, particularly in large cities in Western Russia, where there are sizeable Chechen populations. 7. For this reason ECRE is against the forced or mandatory return to the Russian Federation of any Chechen seeking international protection and against the promotion of voluntary repatriation to the Russian Federation as a durable solution at the present time as the conditions of "safety and dignity" cannot be upheld. 8. Throughout Europe the treatment of Chechens seeking protection varies considerably, with refugee recognition rates (5) in 2003 (6) ranging from 0% (Slovakia) to 76.9% (Austria) (7), showing that for many Chechens, the outcome of the ‘asylum lottery’ will very much depend on the country in which they seek asylum. 9. ECRE urges European governments to ensure that Chechen asylum seekers can avail themselves of protection on their territory, through adequate access to fair asylum procedures. 10. For Chechens in need of international protection a viable internal protection alternative is not currently available and, therefore, should not be invoked as a bar to granting asylum. 11. ECRE urges European States to adopt a full and inclusive interpretation of the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to Refugees (hereinafter “the 1951 Convention”) with regard to asylum seekers from Chechnya. Subsidiary and complementary forms of protection (hereinafter “subsidiary protection”) should only be accorded to those Chechens who have been determined as not qualifying as refugees under the 1951 Convention, but who nevertheless require international protection. 12. ECRE urges European states to ensure that all those accorded subsidiary protection enjoy the same rights as Convention refugees, in particular with regard to family unity and socio-economic rights and as a minimum should be granted those rights detailed in the Qualifications Directive (8). Those Chechens who fail to be granted refugee status or a form of subsidiary protection should be granted a legal status, which affords them their human rights and a dignified standard of living in the host country. 13. ECRE urges Member States to support those ‘new’ Member States receiving more refugees from Chechnya, because of their geographical location. Support could be achieved through utilising Article 3 (2) of the Dublin II Regulation (9) to adopt responsibility for examining all asylum claims from Chechen asylum seekers lodged on the territory of the Member State, without transferring the Chechen asylum seeker to the first country of arrival in the European Union; and by utilising Article 15 of the Regulation (the Humanitarian Clause) to ensure that family unity is preserved and that applications from family members and other dependent relatives can be processed in the same country if the asylum seeker so requests. Member States might also seek to find additional ways of supporting new Member States with historically less well-developed systems. 14. ECRE would urge EU Member States not to transfer Chechens to other Member States under the Dublin II Regulation unless they can ensure that they will have access to a fair and efficient asylum procedure. The risk of refoulement from some EU Member States (10) means that extreme care must be taken in such cases in order not to expose refugees to this danger in breach of States’ obligations under Article 33 (2) of the 1951 Convention and Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter ECHR) and the Convention Against Torture. 15. Other States outside the border of the enlarged EU (11) are struggling to cope with high numbers of Chechen refugees to an even greater extent given their relatively new asylum systems, few financial resources, political tensions caused by the close proximity of and/or relationship with the Russian Federation. This is often whilst supporting other sizeable groups of IDPs and refugees from other conflicts in the region (12). 16. While recognising these difficulties ECRE has serious concerns about access to asylum procedures for Chechen asylum seekers in the Republic of Belarus and Ukraine and urges these governments to ensure that Chechen asylum seekers can avail themselves of protection on their territory. 17. While welcoming efforts undertaken by States in this region and acknowledging the financial limitations affecting many of them, ECRE is also concerned about conditions for refugees and asylum seekers and the ability of governments in Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine to accord refugees on their territory as a minimum those rights granted in the 1951 Convention concerning the Status of Refugees. 18. Until these conditions are in place, ECRE would urge EU Member States as a minimum not to transfer Chechen asylum seekers or Chechens who have had their applications for asylum rejected to third countries such as Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Moldova or Ukraine. 19. In a spirit of responsibility sharing and solidarity, ECRE would support the resettlement of Chechen refugees from Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Georgia to EU Member States, due to particularly high numbers of refugees from Chechnya in these countries, and in the case of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, little or no access to legal status (13), and the allocation of financial resources to Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to help governments ensure more effective protection and better conditions for refugees on their territories. 20. The Russian Federation should respect the concept of internally displaced persons as defined in the 1998 United Nations Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (14) (hereinafter the 1998 UN Guiding Principles) and as recommended by the Council of Europe (15), and should ensure that all IDPs have access to rights as set out in those Guiding Principles. 21. ECRE is against the promotion of return of IDPs to Chechnya or to other regions of the Russian Federation until conditions of safety and dignity can be upheld. Conditions must be in place to ensure that it is safe to return – physically, legally and materially (16). It is the duty of the Russian government with the support of the international community to ensure that these conditions are in place. 22. ECRE would strongly urge the Russian Federation to take active measures to halt the gross violations of human rights currently taking place in Chechnya and to take all possible measures to address the issue of discrimination towards Chechens within the Russian Federation. 23. This paper should be read in conjunction with ECRE’s Position on Return, Position on the Harmonisation of the Interpretation of Article 1 of the Refugee Convention, Guidelines on Fair and Efficient Procedures for Determining Refugee Status and in light of other ECRE policy statements. (17) Footnotes: (1) This paper only relates to ethnic Chechens as it is understood that asylum seekers and refugees from the Russian Federation seeking asylum in Europe are primarily Chechen (see UNHCR Position regarding Asylum Seekers and Refugees from the Chechen Republic, Russian Federation, 22 October 2004). Applications for asylum from ethnic Russians, those from an ethnically mixed background as well as from those of non-Russian and non-Chechen ethnic backgrounds (e.g. Ingush), should be considered on an individual basis. (2) They were the largest group in 2003 and 2004. Although the most recent statistics show a sharp drop in the number of Chechens seeking asylum in Europe in the first quarter of 2005, they are still the second largest group. See UNHCR: (http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/statistics/opendoc.pdf?tbl=STATISTICS&id=428da0db2). For 2003 and 2004 see www.unhcr.ch/statistics (3) UNHCR Position regarding Asylum Seekers and Refugees from the Chechen Republic Russian Federation. October 2004. (4) International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, Chechnya: More of the Same. Extrajudicial Killings, Enforced Disappearances, Illegal Arrests, Torture. March 2005. http://www.nhc.no/land/tsjetsjenia/2005/IHFmarsrapport.pdf Refugee recognition rate = Number of recognised refugees divided by the total number of recognised refugees, number of persons granted other forms of protection, and persons rejected protection x 100%. (5) Refugee recognition rates for 2004 were not available at time of writing. (6) For more information on refugee recognition rates for Chechens in different European countries see Norwegian Refugee Council, Whose responsibility? Protection of Chechen internally displaced persons and refugees, May 2005. (7) Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification of third country nationals and stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection granted. (8) Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national. (9) Including Slovakia and Greece, see paper by Norwegian Refugee Council and The Transfer of Chechen Asylum Seekers from Norway to Greece In Accordance with the Dublin Convention, 2002. http://www.noas.org/Dbase/pub/print/TheTransferofChechenAsyl.shtml . Recent concerns highlighted by Greek members of the ECRE ELENA network confirm that problems still occur. (10) Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Ukraine. (Please note: this paper will not look in detail at the situation in Kazakhstan as this country is outside the Council of Europe definition of Europe. For information on Kazakhstan see Norwegian Refugee Council, Whose responsibility? Protection of Chechen internally displaced persons and refugees, May 2005). (11) For example, see Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Recommendation 1570 (2002) on the Situation of refugees and displaced persons in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. (12) The resettlement of Chechens from Azerbaijan and Georgia is already happening but on a very small scale. Countries who have accepted refugees from Azerbaijan or Georgia include Canada, the US, Sweden, Ireland and the Netherlands. See Norwegian Refugee Council, Whose responsibility? Protection of Chechen internally displaced persons and refugees, May 2005. (13) The UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, UN Document E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (hereinafter the UN Guiding Principles) were developed by the UN Representative of the Secretary General on Internally Displaced Persons, Dr. Francis M. Deng. Although they do not constitute a binding instrument like a treaty, they reflect and are consistent with international human rights law and humanitarian law. For the full text see: http://www.reliefweb.int/ocha_ol/pub/idp_gp/idp.html (14) Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Situation of refugees and displaced persons in the Russian Federation and some other CIS countries, Recommendation 1667 (2004). http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/AdoptedText/ta04/EREC1667.htm (15) See the ECRE Position on Returns, paragraphs 25-27, for a detailed description of conditions that need to be in place to ensure physical, legal and material safety for returnees. www.ecre.org. (16) In particular, ECRE’s Information Note on the Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification of third country nationals and stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection granted, Position on Refugee Children (1996), Position on Asylum Seeking and Refugee Women (1997) and Position on Complementary Protection at www.ecre.org Full report (pdf* format - 236 KB) http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2005/ecre-rus-jun05.pdf http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/VBOL-6DNGJP?OpenDocument