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25 February 2004,
Volume V, Issue 08 CHECHNYA WEEKLY: Pressures increase on refugees in Ingushetia Russian and Ingush authorities have become increasingly brazen this month in using utilities cut-offs to pressure refugees in Ingushetia to return to Chechnya. On February 20 the UN High Commissioner for Refugees issued a statement protesting the elimination of gas supplies for ten refugee settlements. A spokesman for the UN body said that "whatever the pretext, it is unacceptable to cut utilities, particularly heating gas, in mid-winter." He added that the cut-offs "bring into question the voluntary nature of the return." An article by Igor Naidenov in last week's Moskovskie novosti further undermined claims by Federal and Ingush authorities that the refugees are allowed to choose freely whether to return. Residents of the Satsita refugee camp in Ingushetia told Naidenov how soldiers had entered the camp a few days earlier. The soldiers repeated the already familiar warning that the camp's water, gas and lights are to be cut off on the first of March. At the same time, authorities have continued to promise that refugees will receive compensation for their destroyed homes if only they return to Chechnya. The refugees know full well, they told Naidenov, that there is no chance of receiving full compensation: From one-third to one-half must be kicked back as a bribe. But that is not the worst of it: Accepting a compensation payment can mean forfeiting one's life. One refugee told the reporter of an acquaintance who had allowed himself to be persuaded by the authorities, and who returned to Chechnya with his family to receive his compensation. He was killed on the day after his arrival in the war-torn republic and all his compensation money was stolen. Though the Putin administration claims that normal conditions are returning to Chechnya, refugees know from the experiences of their friends and relatives that the republic is still far from safe for them. (According even to official estimates, the number of families who have actually received compensation payments is low. A February 21 Associated Press article cited a Grozny bank official who put the total number so far at only 1,600. According to a February 20 article in the Moscow Times, a reporter who visited a Grozny dormitory housing some 500 newly returned refugees--one that the Kadyrov administration displays as a model--found that only five of the buildings had even managed to assemble the documents needed to apply for compensation. None of those five applications had been granted.) Naidenov of Moskovskie novosti asked one of the Satsita camp's residents if they planned to observe the anniversary of the 1944 deportation to Kazakhstan. "Yes, if they don't deport us now to Chechnya," was the reply. The February 20 statement from the UN refugee agency noted that many of the recent gas cut-offs, which "have left more than 2,000 displaced Chechens in the bitter winter cold," were to rooms restored not long before by private international charitable organizations "as alternative shelter for Chechens living in tented camps threatened with closure." Kadyrov forces implicated in kidnappings The masked gunmen who conduct state sanctioned kidnappings in Chechnya often arrive in armored vehicles; this has been considered to be proof that they are federal servicemen. But according to an article in last week's Moskovskie novosti, the members of Akhmad Kadyrov's private army who engage in such kidnappings also have access to armored personnel carriers. The widow of a kidnapping victim in Grozny told the weekly's correspondent, Igor Naidenov, that the men who burst into her home were speaking with each other in Chechen, not in Russian. "I asked where Chechens would have managed to get armored personnel carriers," wrote Naidenov. "Aminat looked at me as if I had just been born. It turns out that the [Kadyrovite] Chechens have regular business dealings with the federals for this purpose, renting out their armored vehicles for their nighttime operations--and then sharing half the profits with them. More recently they are said to have begun sharing only one-third, not half. Just who decided these terms is unknown."
Annyversary goes unobserved in Grozny The Kadyrov administration made a deliberate choice not to hold any public, official observation of the deportation's 60th anniversary, according to a February 21 article by Timur Aliev for the London-based Institute for War and Peace Reporting (available via the institute's website at www.iwpr.net). A faculty member at Grozny State University told Aliev that he had asked whether any commemorative activities were scheduled, and had found that the answer was no. "This topic is not raised much, so as not to annoy the authorities," the history instructor said. Russian security services said to be protecting Basev The exact nature of the relations that exist between Shamil Basaev and Russia's security organs have long been a topic of speculation, especially in light of the federal forces' continuing failure to capture the country's most wanted terrorist in such a tiny area as Chechnya. Ramzan Kadyrov, head of his father Akhmad's personal security service, made a sensational allegation about this subject in an interview with Yelena Shesternina of Russky kurier, published on February 19. The allegation would not have been newsworthy if it had been seen on a pro-separatist website, but it is not what one expects to hear from an ostensible ally of the Russian armed services. Pointing out that the younger Kadyrov has offered a substantial cash reward--5 million rubles, the equivalent of about US$170,000--for Basaev's death or capture, Shesternina asked, "why haven't you found him?" Ramzan Kadyrov replied, "You know, I have developed the impression that he is very well guarded." Shesternina asked who was guarding him--the rebel guerrillas? "No," was Kadyrov's startling answer. "The [federal] special services. Chechnya is not such an enormous place that he could lose himself there. I have enough resources to find Basaev--but I can't. The only people who could hide him so well are the special services." Asked why Russia's security agencies would do such a thing, Ramzan said that "when this war is over, there won't be anyone to blame terrorist attacks on. And nobody will be handing out medals and promotions to the special services...What happens now is that army or security service officers come and spend some time in Chechnya, and within a month get promoted several times. That's not possible in any other region. It's well known that lots of money is being made in this war, and also careers that will make your head spin. The special services need to keep Basaev alive and healthy so as to cover themselves with him." Asked by Chechnya Weekly in a February 23 telephone interview to comment on the exchange, veteran Chechnya journalist Musa Muradov said that "of course there is a basis for thinking this" [i.e., that Basaev has an on-going special relationship with Russia's security services]. But, he added, "it's surprising that Ramzan would say it." Misuse of Chechen aid funding gets attention Subsidies from the central government in Moscow for the restoration of Chechnya's social and economic infrastructure are being used to pay suppliers and contractors without any competitive bidding process. A February 17 article by Viktor Semenov in Russky kurier quoted federal auditor Sergei Ryabukhin: "There is no clear mechanism for the organization of competitive purchasing of materials and equipment. Services also are not purchased according to market prices, and that is very important to take into account." Ryabukhin said that the federal auditing chamber had discovered "a very large number of violations" connected with the misuse or ineffective use of federal funds. Some forty criminal investigations into such cases have been opened. Ryabukhin seemed to think of these cases as an indication of his agency's vigilance, but they actually seem like a rather small number given the extent of corruption and the amounts of money involved. Last year the federal budget included 3.5 billion rubles for the restoration of Chechnya--the equivalent of about US$120 million. Limited return
for OSCE to Chechnya
25 February 2004, Volume V, Issue 08 CHECHNYA WEEKLY: News and analysis on the crisis in Chechnya |