References & Notes
[1] Human Rights Watch, “Swept Under: Torture, Forced Disappearances, and Extrajudicial Killings During Sweep Operations in Chechnya,” A Human Rights Watch Report, vol. 14 no. 2 (D), February 2002. Hereinafter, “Swept Under.” Human Rights Watch also published a report on the Russian authorities’ botched investigation into a mass grave in Chechnya. See also Human Rights Watch, “Burying the Evidence: The Botched Investigation into a Mass Grave in Chechnya,” A Human Rights Watch Report, vol. 13, no. 3 (D), May 2001, and Human Rights Watch, “The ‘Dirty War’ in Chechnya: Forced Disappearances, Torture, and Summary Executions,” A Human Rights Watch Report, Vol. 13, No. 1 (D), March 2001.
[2] On September 12, President Vladimir Putin said, “We have reason to believe that bin Laden's people are connected with the events currently taking place in our . . . Chechnya. We know his people are present there. Our American partners cannot but be concerned about this circumstance. So we have a common foe, the common foe being international terrorism.” Susan B. Glasser and Peter Baker, “Putin, Bush Weigh New Unity Against A ‘Common Foe’,” Washington Post, September 13, 2001.
[6]. See, for example, "Report on the Activity of the Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation for Guaranteeing Rights and Freedoms of Men and Citizens in the Chechen Republic for the Year 2000," Moscow, December 2000. (Hereinafter, "Kalamanov report," for Vladimir Kalamanov, who is the special representative.) In describing the accountability process, the report notes on p. 20: "The problem of crimes committed by servicemen is the most acute and painful issue for the public, including international public opinion. While noting the existence of such facts, the Special Representative underscores their ad hoc and exclusive character."
[7]. Ian Traynor, "Moscow Makes Heroes of its War Generals," Guardian (London), December 29, 1999. At the ceremony, then-President Boris Yeltsin praised General Shamanov's conduct in Chechnya as "faultless."
[8]. "In accordance with and within the limits of established legislation, in carrying out an anti-terrorist operation damage may be caused to life, health and property of terrorists, as well as to other law-protected interests. However servicemen, experts and other persons shall be exempted from liability for such damage, in accordance with legislation of the Russian Federation." (Article 21, on exemption of liability for damage, of the law on Suppression of Terrorism, adopted July 25, 1998). At the request of the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, a group of legal experts examined the law in June 2000 and expressed concern about this exemption from liability.
[9] A May 26, 2000 State Duma decision requires that all investigations into crimes committed before May 26, 2000 that carry a maximum sentence of three years' imprisonment or less must be ceased. Both desecrating a corpse and covering up serious crimes fall into this category.
[10]. Human Rights Watch has a copy of the forensic report on file.
[11] Human Rights Watch, “The ‘Dirty War’ in Chechnya: Forced Disappearances, Torture, and Summary Executions,” A Human Rights Watch Report, vol.13, no.1(D), March 2001.
[12] Human Rights Watch published an abbreviated version of this report on April 16, 2001 in a memorandum entitled, “Russian Investigation of Mass Grave Not Credible Effort.”
[13]
Extrapolations from survey results led Physicians for Human Rights to estimate
that Russia's federal forces had killed more than 4,600 civilians and tortured
more than 1,800. Physicians for Human Rights, 'Random Survey Conducted by
U.S. Medical Group of Displaced Chechens Finds Widespread Killings and Abuses
by Russia's Forces', February 26, 2000. Visit www.phrusa.org/research/chechnya/chechen_displaced.html
[14] Human Rights Watch has released
a number of reports on violations in Chechnya, including,'Civilian Killings
in Stavopromyslovski,' 'No Happiness Remains: Alkhan-Yurt,' 'A Day of Slaughter
in Novye Aldi,' and 'Welcome to Hell: Arbitrary Detention, Torture, and Extortion
in Chechnya,' www.hrw.org/campaigns/russia/chechnya/
[15]
PHR was unable to collect information about official detention facilities
such as the Chernokozovo facility and did not collect first hand accounts
of abuses by Chechen fighters.
[17] Fifty-two cases are described in this report, the remaining cases are on file with Human Rights Watch.
[18] FSB is the Russian acronym for the Federal Security Service, the principal successor organization to the KGB. GRU stands for Glavnoe Razvedovatelnoe Upravlenie, the main intelligence agency for the Russian armed forces. MVD is the Russian acronymfor the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
[19] Amnesty International, "Disappearances" and Political Killings: Human Rights Crisis of the 1990s (Amsterdam: Amnesty International, 1994).
[20] This was the first thematic mechanism created by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNHCR).
[21] See UNHCR website, www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs6.htm#man. (Accessed March 2001).
[22] General Assembly resolution 47/133, adopted 18 December 1992.
[23] In June 1994 the General Assembly of the Organization of American States adopted the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons, which replicates many of the provisions of the U.N. declaration.
[24] "RIA reports results of successful crime fighting in Chechnya in 2000," RIA News Agency/BBC Monitoring, May 28, 2000.
[25] In addition, HRC Memorial has been sending joint fact-finding missions to the region with the US human rights organization Human Rights Watch/Helsinki.
[26] P.Felgengauer, «Mikhail Kolesnikov: Dudaev Must be Crushed,» Segodnya, February 10, 1995.
[27] In using the term «human shield» we mean the following: a demonstrative, forced involvement of non-armed individuals (civilians or prisoners) as military objects, in battle formations, or at the disposition of military units, divisions, or detachments in such a way that these individuals are the primary victims in the event of armed conflict. This tactic is used to impede the actions of one’s adversary and to secure one’s own safety. In using such a definition, we would highlight the fact that this tactic is premeditated and forced upon non-armed individuals who are the primary victims of casualties. We have excluded from this definition the notion of voluntary and conscientious participation by a non-armed individual as an action of resistance against an armed adversary. Examples of this include the events which occured at the television center in Vilnius and at the White House in Moscow in 1991. The mass capture of civilians as hostages is likewise not included in the definition of a «human shield».
[28] At the moment of completion of this report, Article 126.1 of the Criminal Code of the RF says the following: «The capture and detaining of an individual as a hostage, in combination with threats to kill, injure, or further detention of that individual with the intention of forcing the government, an international organization, a legal entity, individual or group of individuals to engage in or refrain from engaging in an activity as a condition for the freeing of the hostage...»
[30] As a result of this incident, talks were held in the village of Bamut on 13.03.96 between Yu. A. Rybakov, a Deputy of the State Duma, A. B. Cherkasov, a representative of the «Memorial» HRC, and representatives of the armed forces and administration of the CRI.
[31] The «Memorial» HRC is preparing a book devoted to the fate of all Russian soldiers taken prisoner by the Chechen forces as well as civilians who were kidnapped.
[32] In the weekly newspaper, «Sobesednik», a story of three such agents was printed.
[33] In order to stop the increasing turnover in the trade of prisoners, D. Dudaev, the President of the CRI ordered that their detention be centralized. Following the centralization, however, the conditions of their detention worsened considerably. It is possible that the «prisoner camps» were superior, however, to the Russian «filtration camps»: In the spring of 1996, over several dozen men died there from hunger or were executed.
[34] On December 11, 1994, in the city of Khasavyurt, a crowd of unarmed Chechen-Akkiny (one of the ethnic subgroups of Chechens living in Dagestan) surrounded APCs of the 57th special assignment regiment. Behind the crowd were armed men. Colonel-lieutenant V. I. Seregin did not give the order to fire into the crowd and 59 soldiers from the IA MIA RF were taken prisoner by the crowd. This episode (which appears to be the only one of its kind) has served as the basis for the statement that «Chechens fight behind the backs of their women and children», i.e. use them as «human shields». It cannot, however, be looked at as the use of a «human shield» since the unarmed people acted voluntarily and those with arms didn’t participate in this particular attack.
[35] See the definition given in the Introduction.
[36] According to sources from the Chechen side, there was in December 1994 a «secret plan to deport the Chechen people» and the Ministry of Emergency Situations acted within the framework of this plan. According to an interview with Isa Madaev, the Minister of Internal Affairs of the CRI conducted in October 1996 by O. Trusevich and A. Cherkasov of the «Memorial» HRC, the Chechen detachments did not intercept those departing from Grozny but rather those attempting to cross the borders of Chechnya. In the opinion of the «Memorial» HRC, this version does not serve as a justification for the actions of the CRI who forced civilians to return to war entrenched Grozny.
[37] If the attack was carried out by a suicide truck bombing one expects the blast taking place due to the impact of the truck with the building. If so, why do we observe the crater of the blast several meters away from the perimeter of the building?
[45] "Papers Respecting the Settlement of Circassian Emigrants in Turkey", London Printed by Harrison and Sons.
[47] Berkok, General Ismail, Caucasus in History (1958), Istanbul Press, p. 526
[48] Kemal Karpat, "The Status of the Muslim under European Rule: the Eviction and Settlement of the Cerkes", Journal of the Institute Minority Affairs, Vol.1, No:2
[49] First 4 trucks from Stravpol carrying 80 tons of urgent humanitarian aid supplies arrived at Nazran after 10 hours of a night travel. During that time, most of the refuges who fled from the Russian military bombardments were at Sunjinski region of Ingushetia. (according to the information given by UNHCR spokesman Kris Janowski in a press conference in Geneva on 1 October 1999)