Webeditor's comment:
A quite interesting comparison between two opposing points of view. The first
article advocates a politics based on values and "that the United States
must distinguish Russia's actions in Chechnya from U.S. efforts against
global Islamist terrorism", while the second, the realpolitical point of
view, dismisses this altogether as an "emotional idealism".
In my humble opinion all depends from which one of these two conflicting views
will be chosen, applying it to the global politics of the next decades, that
will frame the international order in the near future. Abstracting from Chechnya,
thinking also at other conflict areas, in its essence it is here were humanity
will have to decide on itself. And only if it will take the right path it will
survive.
The New Republic
Separate War
by the Editors
Issue date 12.02.02
All the evidence suggests that Vladimir Putin is about to retaliate against
last month's terrorist attack on a Moscow theater with characteristic
ruthlessness. His generals have halted a planned troop pullout from Chechnya
and vowed a renewed Russian offensive. Putin himself has stepped up his
rhetoric, vowing never to negotiate with Chechnya's elected president. And the
Russian Duma has voted to amend media laws to further restrict press coverage
of future military actions in the breakaway republic.
Given Russia's past forays into Chechnya, these developments ought to be a matter
of some concern in Washington. Human rights organizations have documented
Russian abuses in Chechnya in gory detail--including, in one recent case,
the discovery of the burned remains of nine civilians killed by Russian
forces. At least 140,000 Chechens have been forced to flee the province.
Yet, so far, Washington has shown virtually no concern at all. President
Bush has declared this a "`time of solidarity" with Russia. Speaking with
European reporters earlier this week, the president explained that America's
"good friend" Putin should "do what it takes to protect his people from
... terrorist attacks"--implicitly acceding to Putin's long-standing
argument that his actions in Chechnya are of a piece with the U.S. war
on terrorism.
They're not. Russia clearly faces a threat in Chechnya, but, Putin's spin
notwithstanding, that threat is secession, not global Islamic terrorism.
Unlike the killers in Balind at the World Trade Center, the Chechens have
a specific, local grievance: They want autonomy or independence. According
to Thomas de Waal, co-author of a comprehensive book on Chechnya titled Chechnya:
Calamity in the Caucasus, most Chechens are liberal Sufi Muslims who have
no sympathy for Islamic fundamentalism and whose decade-long campaign
has focused on one goal: leaving Russia. (Chechens are far more likely
to dress in leather jackets or traditional headscarves than chadors.)
What's more, in part because the region is surrounded on three sides by
Russian troops and on the fourth by high mountains, few Islamist volunteers
have traveled to Chechnya from abroad.
Putin's American apologists say the United States can't afford to be squeamish
about human rights in Chechnya because we need Russia's help in Afghanistan,
Iraq, and beyond. But, in fact, it is precisely because of geostrategic
concerns that the United States must distinguish Russia's actions in Chechnya
from U.S. efforts against global Islamist terrorism. Giving Moscow a free pass
in Chechnya--as the Bush administration seems strongly inclined to do--will
further alienate moderate Muslims around the world from U.S. goals and
interests. Indeed, Islamists have already begun using Russian atrocities
in Chechnya as an issue with which to bludgeon the United States. On his latest
audiotape attempt to reach his target audience-- young Muslim men--Osama bin
Laden explicitly refers to Chechnya. Islamic extremists in Britain have highlighted
Chechnya in speeches, calling on followers to fight the United States
and its allies to the death. Islamist leaders in Pakistan have made the
plight of Chechen Muslims a central focus of their anti-Western diatribes.
Certainly, fear of offending public opinion in the Muslim world cannot be the
overriding goal of U.S. foreign policy. There are many cases--the war
in Afghanistan, the potential war with Iraq, U.S. support for Israel--where
American security and American principles require ignoring the sentiment
of the Muslim "street." But Russia's abuses in Chechnya are not such a case.
Our values clearly impel us to push for a peaceful solution to that conflict.
And, while Russia's cooperation in the war on terrorism is important,
Putin has many more reasons to cooperate with the United States than not.
Ultimately, if the United States hopes to win the war on terrorism, it must
persuade moderate Muslims that it is not fighting a war against Islam.
Several of the biggest catches in the battle against Al Qaeda have taken
place in Pakistan, for instance, where a shaky government relies on the
support of moderate Muslims and where Islamists have made major gains over the
past year. The United States, in other words, needs not only military
victories but political ones as well. Coming to the aid of threatened
Muslim minorities in the Balkans during the 1990s helped improve America's
image in the Muslim world, demonstrating that our political ideals pertain
regardless of religion. Funding programs for moderate Muslim scholars
and helping build liberal, secular schools so poor children in countries
like Pakistan have an alternative to radical madrassas may help as well. But
such efforts will be of little use if the United States is seen as abetting,
without comment or criticism, the Russian bloodletting in Chechnya. The world
is watching.
the Editors
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Staying the Course: Realism and the Bush Administration
November 27, 2002
By Nikolas K. Gvosdev
In the National Interest describes itself as America's only realist weekly
(although, in the interests of full disclosure, I must reveal that a British
foreign policy website disputes our realist credentials, because of our
willingness to entertain alternative points of view).
A colleague of mine, however, raised an interesting question. Why is a
foreign affairs weekly edited "from a realist perspective" needed? After
all, who wants to read editorials couched in pragmatic rationalism when
emotional idealism makes for better copy? There is a grain of truth in his assertion.
After all, it is much sexier to couch military action against Saddam Hussein
as a noble undertaking to spread democracy than as a pedestrian exercise
to disarm Iraq, to remove its weapons-of-mass-destruction capability and
maintain U.S. political standing and power in the Middle East. Lofty aims--however
unrealistic--rather than practical objectives are what stir the blood
of the citizenry, right?
It is to combat this kind of indulgence that In the National Interest
exists. As realists, we believe policy should be evaluated by its likely
results, not by the motives or intentions of its framers. Realists are
prepared to take calculated risks to achieve their ends, but shy away
from gambling outright with a nation's blood or treasure. For the past year,
the soul of the Bush Administration has wavered between realism and various
forms of idealism. Beyond securing national interests, idealistic crusades
beckon; the temptation to use American power to reshape the world is quite
potent. One pernicious form of idealistic moralizing that has crept back into
the discourse is a form of American exceptionalism that says that when
terrorists strike other nations, they must have justified reasons for
doing so, but that attacks on Americans are in a separate class altogether.
It is a departure from the stark realism embraced by the Bush Administration
immediately after the 9/11 attacks. In their aftermath, the administration
endorsed the formula proposed by Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov,
that there were no "good" terrorists. No matter how oppressed a particular
ethnic or religious minority, no matter how noble the cause, targeting
civilians or the civilian infrastructure of society could not be tolerated.
It appeared that the Bush Administration was prepared to recognize that
any successful war on terrorism meant combating political chaos in favor of
strengthening legitimate states. Tamils, Albanians, Chechens, Uighurs,
Palestinians, Basques--all might have legitimate grievances, but no cause
could justify that tactics that had, in the end, turned the World Trade Center
into a funeral pyre for 3,000 souls.
Other major powers--notably Russia and India--took Washington's rhetoric of
a broad, sustained campaign against "all forms" of international terrorism
at face value. So did terrorists--and their sponsors. It was no coincidence
that within three weeks of the attacks (on September 28) Chechen separatists
announced their willingness to open talks with Russia--without preconditions.
On October 23, the Irish Republican Army took the first steps toward
disarmament. Less than a week later, the Basque ETA proclaimed it would
lay down its weapons if Spain would consent to a referendum on independence.
Meanwhile, the government of Bosnia--after tolerating the presence of
Islamist radicals on its soil for years--moved to arrest and deport a
number of individuals tied to terrorist activities in the Middle East
and Europe.
Then the sympathy loophole re-opened. There was a marked reluctance to grant
a blank check to states like Russia, China or India in coping with regional
insurgencies in Chechnya, Xinjiang or Kashmir. Perhaps "individuals" affiliated
with guerrilla movements in these countries engaged in terrorist "tactics",
some argued in Washington, but disarming these groups, by force
if necessary, was not the answer. Many Europeans applied a similar logic
to the Middle East, characterizing Palestinian suicide bombings as legitimate
(even if regrettable) resistance to occupation rather than as terrorism
directed against civilians.
As a result, the anti-terrorist coalition began to fray. This, in turn, emboldened
groups in Latin America, Eurasia and the Middle East to conclude that
the old refrain, "One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter",
would allow them to cloak their violent activities behind latent sympathy
for their causes. An editorial in the December 2-9, 2000 issue of The New Republic
epitomizes this regrettable shift. Entitled "A Separate War", it argues
that "the United States must distinguish Russia's actions in Chechnya
from U.S. efforts against global Islamic terrorism." The issue at hand,
they maintain, is separatism ("self-determination"), not terrorism.
This, of course, is a distinction readily embraced by the defenders of Yasir
Arafat as well. In many ways, Aslan Maskhadov is the Arafat of the Caucasus.
Maskhadov denounces terrorist acts but his administration has proven unable
or unwilling to prevent others acting in the name of the Chechen national
movement from planning and carrying out operations like the seizure
of the Moscow theater (a target whose military significance still eludes
me). There is much to be critical of in the Russian record on Chechnya. A
heavy-handed military campaign that brutalizes the civilian populace is
counterproductive. In the spirit of partnership, the United States
should be prepared to offer constructive advice (and back it up with concrete
assistance when necessary and appropriate).
Most Russians support autonomy for Chechnya. (The 1994 agreement between the
Federation and Tatarstan provides an excellent model.) The main issue,
especially for Chechnya's immediate neighbors in the Russian Federation--including
the other Muslim republics of the North Caucasus--is whether an autonomous
government in Grozny is prepared to crack down on Islamic militants and
organized crime. So far, the Chechen administrations of Dudayev and Maskhadov
are zero for two-- but that is a separate issue.
Unfortunately, the editors at The New Republic have not examined closely
enough Chechnya's record during its two de facto periods of independence
(1991-1994 and 1996-1999), which belies many of the claims that
they make. The reality is that international terrorist movements have
hijacked and infiltrated separatist movements all over the world
to further their own objectives. The neat distinction they seek to draw,
between "terrorism" and "separatism", is often blurred in the real
world. Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon (respectively the director and
senior director for counterterrorism at the National Security Council
during the second Clinton Administration) observed that such clear lines
often do not exist. In their recent book, The Age of Sacred Terror, the
fact that "donations for the mujahidin in Chechnya were also funding the
terrorists in Afghanistan did not register" among many of those engaged
in counter-terrorism efforts, especially in the Middle East; people persisted
in trying to create separate categories for what constituted "terrorism"
and what constituted "separatism." Certainly, encouraging Chechen or Kashmir
moderates to effectively distance themselves from radical forces and helping
to facilitate negotiations is a worthwhile cause--but as ongoing difficulties
with the Palestinians demonstrates, it is far easier said than done. Therefore,
as long as separatists in Chechnya or Kashmir accept aid and assistance
from international terrorist movements, then Russia's or India's fight
is indeed also our own. If the Bush Administration must avoid the temptation
to draw distinctions between"terrorists" and "freedom fighters" out of
any sense of misguided sympathy. Not only will the war on terrorism
be imperiled, but the chance to actually settle some of the world's festering
conflicts may be dashed. It is noteworthy that in the Philippines, for
example, the Abu Sayyaf organization--tied to Osama bin Laden'sAl-Qaeda
network--has been trying to disrupt the efforts of the central government
and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front--an insurgency comprised of
southern Filipino Muslims--to reach a peaceful settlement and begin the
socioeconomic reconstruction of the region. On the other hand, the ongoing
peace process between the Sri Lankan government and the "Liberation Tigers
of Tamil Eelam" (LTTE) demonstrates that defining clear standards of what
constitutes terrorism--and holding groups accountable--works. Fearful
of losing support by being branded as a terrorist organization, the LTTE
entered into a cease-fire with the Sri Lankan government on February 23,
2002; the most recent high-level contact (between Prime Minister Ranil
Wickremesinghe and the LTTE chief negotiator Anton Balasingham in Oslo
on November 24, 2002) was sufficiently productive that the Sri Lankan
Prime Minister felt confident that the two sides could "take this process
to a point from which there can be no return."
Fortunately, the Bush Administration appears to be returning to the right
path. Earlier this fall, after a delay, the State Department designated
the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) a terrorist organization. Although
the Uighur cause enjoys a good deal of sympathy in Washington, and even
if China remains a repressive society, the definitive recognition that it is
unacceptable for any group to target and attack civilians--even if in
the name of a persecuted minority--has helped to restore credibility to
the war on terrorism.
Realistic appraisal of common threats, not idealistic appeals to values,
produces practical cooperation between states. After a summer of "exporting
democracy" and "regime change" rhetoric, the administration got UN Security
Council Resolution 1441 passed unanimously by focusing on the threats
Saddam's defiance of international institutions and irresponsible pursuit of
weapons of mass destruction pose to all the major powers, not just the
United States. One can only hope that the administration will not stray
from the realist path in dealing with international terrorism and
other hreats to global security.
Nikolas K. Gvosdev is the editor of In the National Interest.